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31 
THE PRIVATE DELEGATION DOCTRINE 
Paul J. Larkin, Jr. 
Abstract 
Since its earliest days, Congress has delegated lawmaking authority 
to Executive Branch officials. Over time, a body of Supreme Court 
caselaw, known as the Delegation Doctrine, has grown up (ostensibly) to 
regulate Congress’s ability to offload legislative authority to 
administrative agencies. Occasionally, however, Congress, like state 
legislatures and municipal councils, bypasses executive officials and 
directly delegates lawmaking power to private parties. The Supreme 
Court has addressed those delegations in only a few cases and struck 
down three of them, the last one in 1936 in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. In 
those cases, the Court did not rely on the Article I Vesting Clause or 
separation of powers principles, as it has in the case of delegations to 
administrative agencies. Instead, the Court held the delegations 
unconstitutional by invoking the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Nonetheless, the Court did not explain why the 
Due Process Clauses played that role, and the Court has not offered a 
rationale for its rulings since 1936. Perhaps the reason for that omission 
is that the Court’s contemporary “procedure vs. substance” dichotomy 
has obscured the original meaning of the Due Process Clause: namely, a 
guarantee that the government comply with “the law of the land” before 
trespassing on someone’s life, liberty, or property. That guarantee, which 
reaches back to Chapter 39 of Magna Carta, means that the government 
cannot legislate around the Constitution by empowering a private party 
to act in a lawless fashion. Put differently, Congress cannot escape 
constitutional restraints by delegating government authority to private 
parties to accomplish indirectly what Congress cannot do directly. So 
viewed, the Private Delegation Doctrine continues to have vitality today 
 
 * John, Barbara & Victoria Rumpel Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage 
Foundation, M.P.P. George Washington University, 2010; J.D. Stanford Law School, 1980; B.A. 
Washington & Lee University, 1977. The views expressed in this Article are the Author’s own 
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Author wants to thank GianCarlo Canaparo, John G. Malcolm, and Zack Smith for excellent 
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in a Symposium on the Delegation Doctrine held by the C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of 
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INTRODUCTION: OF DELEGATIONS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
In 1876, Tom Sawyer taught readers some invaluable rhetorical 
techniques about how to palm off burdensome chores onto someone else.1 
Congress, however, did not need the advice. Since its earliest days, 
Congress has delegated to executive and judicial branch officials the 
lawmaking authority that Congress itself could have exercised2 to create 
rules governing the internal operation of their departments and the 
activities of private parties.3 That practice, like the growth in the number 
 
 1. MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF TOM SAWYER 16–20 (Courage Books 1987) (1876) 
(recounting the fence-whitewashing episode). 
 2. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18 (“Congress 
shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
 3. See, e.g., An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States north-
west of the river Ohio (1787), reprinted in An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory 
North-west of the river Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789) (authorizing the Congress to appoint 
officials to govern the Northwest Territory); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17(b), 1 Stat. 73, 83 
(authorizing the federal courts to issue rules for the “orderly” conduct of judicial business); An 
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of executive departments and agencies,4 continued at a relatively leisurely 
pace until the advent of the New Deal.5 Then, congressional delegations 
accelerated as Congress brought a host of new administrative agencies on 
stream to implement President Franklin Roosevelt’s efforts to end the 
Great Depression.6 The birth of new agencies has continued since then.7 
The result has been the creation of a fourth branch of government—an 
 
Act providing for the payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United States, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95 
(1789) (authorizing the President to issue regulations governing the payment of wounded and 
disabled Revolutionary War soldiers); An Act to establish the Post-Office and Post Roads within 
the United States,  ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 232, 234 (1792) (authorizing the Postmaster General to issue 
rules to subordinates that are necessary for the Service’s business); An Act to regulate trade and 
intercourse with the Indian tribes, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 137, 137 (1790) (authorizing the President 
to prescribe rules governing licenses to trade with the Indian tribes); Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, 
2 Stat. 451, 452 (authorizing the President to issue instructions to enforce the act); Non-
Intercourse Act of 1809, ch. 24, § 11, 2 Stat. 528, 530–31 (authorizing the President to lift an 
embargo on trade with England or France if either country respects the neutrality of the United 
States); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 43–47 (2012); Harold 
J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 738–39 (1994) (reviewing 
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)). 
 4. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, §§ 11–12, 24 Stat. 379, 383 
(creating the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate the railroad industry); Federal 
Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 2, 38 Stat. 251, 251–52 (1913) (creating the Federal Reserve System to 
govern the banking industry). 
 5. For discussions of that history, see DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF 
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 7–10 (2001); MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE 3–10 
(1975); KIMBERLEY S. JOHNSON, GOVERNING THE AMERICAN STATE 5–11 (2007); WILLIAM E. 
NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830–1900, at 113–55 (1982); STEPHEN 
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE 49–59 (1982). 
 6. See JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 2 (2012) (noting that there were more than 100 federal agencies 
and commissions by 1940); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 421, 424 n.9 (1987) (“[I]t was not until the New Deal that the modern agency became a 
pervasive feature of American government. Eleven agencies were created between the framing of 
the Constitution and the close of the Civil War; six were created from 1865 to the turn of the 
century; nine agencies date from 1900 to the end of World War I; nine more were created between 
1918 and the Depression in 1929; and no fewer than 17 were created in the decade between 1930 
and 1940.”). Even more agencies came on board in World War II. See, e.g., Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 201(a), 56 Stat. 23, 29 (making the Office of Price Administration 
into an independent agency). 
 7. The 1970s witnessed a third wave. This time Congress sought to regulate conditions 
inside and outside the nation’s businesses through workplace safety and environmental laws. See, 
e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 
1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 33 U.S.C.); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 
90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The practice continued in 
this century. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, tit. 10, § 1022, 124 Stat. 1376, 1980 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5512). 
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administrative state that Justice Antonin Scalia once tartly described as 
“a sort of junior-varsity Congress”8—seemingly without stop and little 
dip in velocity since the New Deal.9 The administrative state often enjoys 
authority to supervise virtually every aspect of American life that 
Congress itself could govern.10 
There is a closely related doctrine—what this Article refers to as the 
“Private Delegation Doctrine”—that raises many of the same legal and 
policy concerns as the public version, as well as some of its own. The 
Private Delegation Doctrine stems from the practice that legislatures 
occasionally follow of bypassing the bureaucracy entirely and vesting 
governmental authority in private parties or organizations, in this nation 
or elsewhere.11 Examples of privatization cover a broad spectrum from 
the use of publicly funded vouchers to attend non-public schools to the 
use of faith-based churches and organizations to offer mentorship 
programs for children whose parents are incarcerated, and from reliance 
on Medicare-funded private physicians to the engagement of private 
contractors for the physical and personal security of government 
officials.12 What is more, some of the subjects that legislatures place in 
the hands of private actors include functions that were historically 
considered nondelegable or “core” government functions.13 
 
 8. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 9. See, e.g., DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–40, at 7 (2014); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE 
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 6–8, 121 (2010); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative 
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231–33, 1254 (1994). 
 10. The U.S. Supreme Court has occasionally described administrative rulemaking through 
the exercise of congressionally delegated powers as the exercise of “executive” authority, not 
“legislative” power, see, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983); United States v. 
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516–18 (1911), where it has also said Congress cannot delegate to the 
Executive, see, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). Yet, given that, 
as the Court has reminded us, agency rules properly issue pursuant to delegated authority “have 
the ‘force and effect of law,’” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (quoting 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302–03 (1979)), and the “Power” to create “Law” is the 
constitutionally specified role for Congress, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, § 8, cl. 1, it is difficult 
to take the Court’s description seriously. 
 11. Lawmaking delegation to international organizations has become increasingly 
common. See infra note 259. 
 12. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New 
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1246–66 (2003). 
 13. As Professors Jody Freeman and Martha Minow have explained,  
[T]he scope of functions and services for which the government now relies on 
private (and primarily for-profit) actors has grown to encompass activities that 
fall closer to the “core” of what the public in the twentieth century has come to 
identify as the state’s responsibility in a democratic society. . . . [P]rivate 
contractors are now supporting American military operations in Afghanistan and 
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Congressional delegation of lawmaking power, whatever status the 
recipient enjoys, rests uneasily within a democratic republic. As Chief 
Justice Warren Burger once wrote, “the fact that a given law or procedure 
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of 
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the 
Constitution.”14 Articles I and II establish a democratic republic for the 
nation, and Article IV guarantees each state the same form of 
government.15 The Framers spent most of the Convention of 1787 
debating the structure of the new Congress, the powers that it should 
receive, and the manner by which its members should be elected.16 In the 
Constitution that emerged from the Convention, the Article I Vesting 
Clause grants Congress “All legislative Powers,”17 which appears to 
lodge lawmaking authority exclusively in that chamber. That was also the 
prevailing legal and political theory in 1787.18 Moreover, the ability to 
elect their lawmakers mattered greatly to the Colonists. After all, the 
Colonists rebelled against governance by officials they had no hand in 
 
Iraq, supplying security for American diplomats, reconstructing the Iraq oil 
infrastructure, handling domestic and international security and training services, 
conceptualizing and operating an elaborate American border security project, 
running prisons and detention centers, and certifying that hazardous waste 
cleanups conform to statutory requirements.  
Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 6 (Jody Freeman & 
Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
 14. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. 
 15. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (the Guarantee Clause) (“The United States shall guarantee 
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). 
 16. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1996) (discussing in great detail the debates at the Constitutional Convention).  
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 18. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 381 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (“The Power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a 
positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what that positive Grant conveyed, 
which being only to make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power 
to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other hands.”). The Supreme Court 
later endorsed that principle when describing the relationship between the Article I and II 
branches. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692–94 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate 
legislative power . . . is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance 
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution. . . . ‘The true distinction . . . is between 
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it 
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in 
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington etc. R.R. v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 88 
(1852))); Shankland v. Mayor of Wash., 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 390, 395 (1831) (mentioning that “the 
general rule of law is, that a delegated authority cannot be delegated”). 
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choosing,19 and the President and Vice President are the only members 
of the Executive Branch elected to office.20 Accordingly, it is no surprise 
that the debate over the legitimacy and wisdom of congressional 
delegation has lasted for decades.21 
Accompanying that debate has been litigation over the 
constitutionality of particular statutory delegations of lawmaking 
authority to executive agencies. That litigation occurred in three stages. 
The congressional delegations were quite modest in the first stage. Most 
authorized the President to make a finding, whose contours Congress had 
defined, that would trigger the activation or deactivation of a particular 
law.22 The Supreme Court of the United States upheld those delegations23 
 
 19. The Declaration of Independence denounced King George III for “subject[ing] us to a 
jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws,” and for “taking away 
our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our 
Governments.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 15, 23 (U.S. 1776).  
 20. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (declaring that the President and Vice President shall “be 
elected”). 
 21. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 133–34 (1980); JAMES O. 
FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 78–81, 90–94 (1978); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION 
AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 135–36 (1995); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1297–99 
(2003); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for 
the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1399–1400, 1402, 1406 (2000); Ronald A. Cass, 
Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 150–51, 167–68, 174, 177–78 (2017); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven 
Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 252, 263–64 
(2010); Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 807, 807–09, 819 (1999); Jason Iuliano & Keith E. Whittington, The Nondelegation 
Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619, 619, 623, 645 (2017); Dan M. Kahan, 
Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795, 795–96 (1999); Krent, supra note 3, at 
710–12; Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 328–30, 334 
(2002); Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice 
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 513–14 (1988); Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 
1721–24 (2002); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It 
Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224–26, 1228, 1236 (1985). 
 22. See infra notes 23–24. 
 23. The first case, decided in 1813 when the memories of the Convention of 1787 would 
still have been in the minds of congressmen and Supreme Court Justices, was The Cargo of the 
Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). There, the Court upheld the 
delegation to the President of the authority to lift the embargo imposed by the Non-Intercourse 
Act of 1809, ch. 24, § 11, 2 Stat. 528, 530–31, on England and France if he found that they had 
ceased to violate the declared neutrality of the United States in their war. The Brig Aurora, 11 
U.S. at 388. Following The Brig Aurora came Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). 
The Court, through Chief Justice John Marshall, upheld a delegation in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
ch. 20, § 17(b), 1 Stat. 73, 83, to the federal courts to adopt rules for the “orderly” conduct of 
judicial business, on the ground that Congress may authorize the Executive and Judicial Branches 
“to fill up the details” of a general legislative plan. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 42, 43. Next was the 
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because they supplied the President with an “intelligible principle” to 
guide his decision-making.24 During the New Deal, Congress granted the 
President or agencies broad, vaguely defined lawmaking authority in 
statutes such as the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA).25 
That was the second stage, which lasted for only one year. In two 1935 
cases—Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan26 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States27—the Court held that Congress’s delegation went 
too far, effectively handing the President true lawmaking power. Then, 
the Court stopped, beginning the third stage, which has continued to the 
 
Court’s 1892 decision in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). Field upheld a tariff act over the 
challenge that it unlawfully empowered the President to suspend the tariff-free importation of 
certain goods if he found that the exporting nation did not permit a tariff-free entry of those goods 
from the United States. Id. at 680, 694. Again, the Court concluded that the President would make 
only a factual judgment, not a “law” within Congress’s exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 693–94. 
 24. The “intelligible principle” standard came from J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1935), the most important of the early cases. At issue was a tariff act 
that empowered the President to waive customs duties on imported merchandise if their foreign 
production costs equaled those of like goods produced in this country. Id. at 400–03. In an opinion 
written by Chief Justice and former President William Howard Taft, the Court rejected a 
constitutional challenge to the delegation feature of the act. Id. at 412. The statute did no more 
than make the President “the mere agent of the lawmaking department to ascertain and declare 
the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.” Id. at 411. That declaration did not 
involve “the making of law” because it did not empower the President to decide “the expediency 
or just operation” of legislation on the public. Id. at 410–11. The act also contained adequate 
guidance for the President to use in making the necessary findings. See id. at 409. As Chief Justice 
Taft explained, Congress may delegate lawmaking power to federal officials if Congress has 
identified an “intelligible principle” controlling their discretion. Id. While it is unlikely that Chief 
Justice Taft intended that phrase to serve as the test for the legitimacy of all future delegations—
his opinion certainly did not announce that it would serve as any such standard—the Court’s 
recent decisions have treated the “intelligible principle” formulation as the measure of 
congressional delegations. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); 
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996). 
 25. Ch. 90, § 2(a)–(b), 48 Stat. 195, 195, invalidated by Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 
388 (1953), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 26. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Panama Refining held unconstitutional an NIRA provision 
granting the President authority to prohibit the distribution of oil produced in excess of a 
production quota (so-called “hot oil”). Id. at 418, 433.  
 27. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). At issue in Schechter Poultry was Title I, section 3 of NIRA, a 
provision that delegated to trade or industrial groups the authority to define “unfair methods of 
competition” that would become law only when the President approved it. § 3(a)–(b), 48 Stat. at 
196; Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521. As Professor Richard Epstein has noted, “This was no 
small operation.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSIC LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 270 (2014). “In the 
eighteen months between August 1933 and February 1935, the frenzied activities of the Roosevelt 
administration generated some 546 codes, 185 supplemental codes, 685 amendments, and over 
11,000 administrative orders.” Id. The Supreme Court found that delegation unconstitutional. 
Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 542.  
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present.28 Since 1935, the Court has upheld every judgment that Congress 
has told an agency to make, even such policy-laden ones as the tradeoff 
between public health and private profit29 or the presumptive amount of 
time that a convicted offender should spend imprisoned.30 In so doing, 
the Court has deemed every formulation that Congress has whipped up 
to be “intelligible,” even ones as vacuous as “the public interest”31 or 
“excessive profits.”32 As long as Congress has written its statutory text in 
English with some remotely decipherable standard, the Court has upheld 
delegation of even large-scale lawmaking or policy making authority.33  
 
 28. Why it stopped has been the subject of considerable parlor discussion. Perhaps, the 
Court feared that President Franklin Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan could jeopardize the Court’s 
legitimacy, the so-called switch in time that saved the Nine. See GERALD GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 466 (11th ed. 1985); Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Lawyers and the Legislation of 
the Early New Deal, 96 HARV. L. REV. 947, 948 (1983) (book review). Perhaps, the Justices 
changed their minds on the substance of delegation law. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice 
Theory and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 251 (2016) (“The Supreme 
Court ceased its aggressive judicial review of economic legislation during the New Deal. A 
doctrinal explanation why the Court did an about face is that the Court finally realized that its 
decisions had created a Bermuda Triangle-like body of case law where federal and state legislative 
efforts to combat the Great Depression went to die.”). Perhaps, there is another explanation.  
 29. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475–76 (upholding over a delegation challenge the EPA’s 
authority to set ambient air quality standards allowing “an adequate margin of safety”). 
 30. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding over a delegation 
challenge the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s authority to promulgate (then-binding) federal 
Sentencing Guidelines). For an earlier, even more adventurous, delegation to the Secretary of the 
Interior authority to promulgate regulations whose violation would be a federal crime that the 
Court upheld, see United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522–23 (1911). 
 31. See N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 20–21, 27–29 (1932) 
(upholding a provision in the Interstate Commerce Act authorizing the ICC to approve railroad 
acquisitions if it found that the transaction was “in the public interest”). 
 32. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 792–93 (1948) (upholding a provision in the 
Renegotiation Act allowing Congress to recover “excessive profits” from businesses selling goods 
to the federal government during World War II). 
 33. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2122, reh’g denied, 140 S. Ct. 579 
(2019); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472, 475–76 (upholding over a delegation challenge the EPA’s 
authority to set ambient air quality standards “allowing an adequate margin of safety”); Loving v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772–74 (1996) (upholding delegation to the President to prescribe 
aggravating factors for use at sentencing in capital murder cases); Touby v. United States, 500 
U.S. 160, 164, 167 (1991) (upholding delegation to the Attorney General to designate new 
“controlled substances” whose distribution is a federal offense); Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 
490 U.S. 212, 214 (1989) (upholding delegation to the Secretary of Transportation to promulgate 
pipeline user fees); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371, 374, 412 (upholding delegation of authority to 
promulgate sentencing guidelines); Lichter, 334 U.S. at 746, 783, 787 (upholding delegation to 
the Under Secretary of War or the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board to decide whether a 
party made “excessive profits” and, if so, what amount); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 
U.S. 90, 104 (1946) (upholding delegation of authority to Securities and Exchange Commission 
to prevent unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power among security holders); Yakus v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423, 426–27 (1944) (upholding delegation to Price Administrator to 
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Whatever promise Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry might 
have offered constitutional law and political theory as a means of forcing 
Congress to make both the lawmaking and policy making judgments that 
the Framers envisioned, the Supreme Court’s caselaw has not worked out 
that way. As Professor Cynthia Farina rather colorfully put it, “If 
Academy Awards were given in constitutional jurisprudence, 
nondelegation claims against regulatory statutes would win the prize for 
Most Sympathetic Judicial Rhetoric in a Hopeless Case.”34 A majority of 
 
fix “fair and equitable” commodity prices); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 
591, 600, 603, 605 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power Commission to determine “just 
and reasonable” rates); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 506, 516 (1944) (upholding 
delegation to the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration to stabilize or reduce the 
rents for any defense area housing accommodations within a particular defense-rental area 
whenever he found it was “necessary and proper in order to effectuate the purposes of” the 
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 
(1943) (upholding delegation to Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast 
licensing as “public interest, convenience, or necessity” require); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. 
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397, 400 (1940) (upholding delegation to set maximum prices for coal 
when “in the public interest”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312, 
328–29 (1936) (upholding delegation to the President to prohibit the arms sales to certain 
countries if he found that doing so would “contribute to the reestablishment of peace”). Professors 
Cary Coglianese, Tom Merrill, and Cass Sunstein believe that smaller-scale or modified versions 
of the Delegation Doctrine—ones that limit agencies’ authority to what Congress has expressly 
authorized them to do (Merrill and Sunstein) or that take multiple factors into account 
(Coglianese)—would satisfy Vesting Clause concerns and avoid the arbitrary line drawing a 
strong version of the Delegation Doctrine invites. See Cary Coglianese, Dimensions of 
Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (2019); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, 
Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2113 (2004); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1181, 1186 (2018); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316–17 
(2000). How to define the Public Delegation Doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 34. Cynthia R. Farina, Deconstructing Nondelegation, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 87 
(2010). A parallel doctrine also emerged with respect to Article III. It contemplates only “Judges” 
who serve “during good Behavior” (which colloquially means for life) and whose salary “shall 
not be diminished during their Continuance in Office” may exercise the “judicial Power.” U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1. Rather than always use life-tenured judges to adjudicate every dispute, 
however, Congress has established non-Article III courts in various contexts, such as in federal 
territories; in the District of Columbia; and, when a dispute involves the so-called “public rights” 
doctrine, in administrative agencies. The Supreme Court has upheld those delegations of the 
“judicial Power.” See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (upholding 
delegation in the territories); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 390 (1973) (upholding 
delegation in the District of Columbia); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1377–78 (2018) (upholding delegation to the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office to decide on the validity of patents); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50, 54 
(1932) (upholding delegation by applying the “public rights” doctrine to administrative agencies). 
One can define the contours of that body of law no better than the one supposedly limiting 
Congress’s power to delegate lawmaking authority to executive branch agencies. See, e.g., Oil 
States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373 (“In other words, the public-rights doctrine applies to matters ‘arising 
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commentators have agreed with Professor Farina, concluding that the 
Delegation Doctrine is “as dead as a door-nail.”35  
Nonetheless, because hope springs eternal,36 a small but growing 
minority has argued that the doctrine is only “mostly dead.”37 In 2019, 
the Supreme Court gave delegation’s critics some hope that the Court 
might be willing to limit Congress’s authority—depending on how one 
views the issue—“to fill up the details” of a general legislative scheme38 
or devise a corpus of rules from whole cloth. In separate opinions 
involving the same statute39—Gundy v. United States40 and Paul v. 
United States41—five Justices signaled that they are interested in and 
willing to reconsider the Court’s Delegation Doctrine caselaw.42 The 
 
between the government and others, which from their nature do not require judicial determination 
and yet are susceptible of it.’” (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50)). 
 35. CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL AND OTHER CHRISTMAS BOOKS 9 (Robert 
Douglas-Fairhurst ed., 2006) (1843). Like Charles Dickens, the Author does not understand why 
a door-nail has the pride of place in the gallery of the dead, when a “coffin-nail” would seem far 
more deserving of that honor (so to speak). Id. Nevertheless, the lingo predates and will outlast 
us all.  
 36. See Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man: Epistle I, POETRY FOUND., https://www.poetry 
foundation.org/poems/44899/an-essay-on-man-epistle-i [https://perma.cc/MX5Z-HSHE] (“Hope 
springs eternal in the human breast: Man never is, but always to be blest: The soul, uneasy and 
confin’d from home, Rests and expatiates in a life to come.”). 
 37. THE PRINCESS BRIDE 1:12:02 (Act III Communications 1987) (“Well, it just so happens 
that your friend here is only mostly dead. There’s a big difference between mostly dead and all 
dead . . . . Mostly dead is slightly alive.”).  
 38. Which is how Chief Justice John Marshall described a provision in the First Judiciary 
Act that empowered the federal courts to adopt rules for the “orderly” conduct of judicial business. 
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825). 
 39. The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. § 20901–
20962. 
 40. 139 S. Ct. 2116, reh’g denied, 140 S. Ct. 579 (2019).  
 41. 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (mem.).  
 42. Gundy involved the question whether a provision of SORNA violated the 
Nondelegation Doctrine. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (plurality opinion). SORNA created a uniform 
sex offender registration system, requiring individuals convicted of specified sex crimes to 
provide certain identifying information (name, address, and so forth) in every state where they 
live, work, or study. 34 U.S.C. §§ 20913(a), 20914(a). The House of Representatives and the 
Senate disagreed over the issue whether the act’s registration requirements should apply to 
someone convicted of a covered offense before the act went into effect, so they compromised by 
directing the United States Attorney General to resolve that dispute. Id. § 20913(d). The problem, 
however, was that SORNA did not expressly identify any findings that the Attorney General must 
make, nor did it specify any factors that he must consider in reaching a decision. See Gundy, 139 
S. Ct. at 2126. Given that Congress articulated no principle for the Attorney General to use, the 
result was to pose the question whether there is any content to the “intelligible principle” standard 
that the Court had consistently invoked for eighty-plus years to uphold congressional delegations. 
See id. at 2123. In effect, Gundy was the Delegation Doctrine equivalent of the Court’s Commerce 
Clause decision in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), superseded by statute, Violent 
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upshot is it is unknown whether the Delegation Doctrine should receive 
long overdue last rites or additional CPR. It will not be long before entire 
swaths of the Pacific Northwest will be lost to the pages of law journals 
cheering or bemoaning the Justices’ suggestions and launching or 
shooting down various ways of cabining Congress’s willingness to 
offload its work.43 
 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 
2125–26 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)). Lopez raised the issue whether Congress 
has the authority under the Commerce Clause to pass the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4844, which banned the possession of handguns near 
school property, even though there was no requirement that the offense involve any facility of 
interstate commerce, that the crime affect interstate commerce, or that the gun travel in interstate 
commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551; id. at 615 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The argument was that, if 
Congress had the Commerce Clause power to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, then 
the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to pass any law. Id. at 564 (majority opinion). Much 
the same could be said about the relevant provision in SORNA with respect to the Delegation 
Doctrine. 
In an opinion by Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen 
Breyer, and Sonya Sotomayor, a plurality of the Court in Gundy found an intelligible principle 
implicit in the structure of SORNA, the task that it demanded of the Attorney General, and the 
context in which that task appeared. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129. The plurality read the Act as 
requiring pre-Act offenders to register and the duty that the statute imposed on the Attorney 
General as being only the obligation “to apply SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-Act 
offenders as soon as feasible.” Id. Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment on the ground 
that SORNA’s delegation was no more “capacious” than ones the Court had sustained in the past. 
Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring). The dissenting opinion by Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined by Chief 
Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, essentially accused the plurality of nothing 
less than performing “a remarkable job of plastic surgery upon the face of the [statute],” 
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969), to find in it any standard guiding 
the Attorney General’s decision, see Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2132, 1246–47 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
Justice Gorsuch would have found SORNA unconstitutional because it supplied the Attorney 
General with no principle to implement that statute, let alone an intelligible one. Id. 
Like Gundy, Paul involved SORNA. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342. Justice Kavanaugh did not 
participate in Gundy. He wrote a statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Paul to say that 
Justice Gorsuch’s “scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy 
dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases.” Id. (statement of Justice Kavanaugh 
respecting the denial of certiorari). 
 43. The deforestation has already begun. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, Comment, Delegation 
and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 
133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 164 (2019); Coglianese, supra note 33, at 1882; Aaron Gordon, 
Nondelegation, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 718, 726 (2019); Gary Lawson, “I’m Leavin’ It (All) 
Up to You”: Gundy and the (Sort-of) Resurrection of the Subdelegation Doctrine, 2018 CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 31, 32; Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. 
REV. 852, 873–74 (2020); David Schoenbrod, Consent of the Governed: A Constitutional Norm 
that the Court Should Substantially Enforce, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 227–29 (2020); cf. 
Rebecca M. Kysar, Dynamic Legislation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 809, 812, 833–34 (2019) 
(recommending dynamic legislation as a remedy for congressional dysfunction). With this Article, 
the Author might be guilty of contributing a tree or two. 
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There has also been debate in public policy centers and in academia 
about the practice of private delegations. Those discussions ordinarily 
take place under the rubric of the “outsourcing” or “privatization” of a 
government function—viz., the government’s decision to rely on non-
government parties and the private market to implement a federal 
program in lieu of having government officials do so pursuant to 
traditional, government-run programs.44 There has been considerable 
debate over the wisdom of privatization,45 as well as a fair amount of 
scholarship discussing its constitutionality.46 The latter is particularly 
 
 44. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285, 1287, 1307 (2003). 
 45. See, e.g., PHILLIP J. COOPER, GOVERNING BY CONTRACT 1–13 (2003); CATHERINE M. 
DONNELLY, DELEGATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO PRIVATE PARTIES 75–84 (2007); JOHN D. 
DONAHUE, THE WARPING OF GOVERNMENT WORK 106–18 (2008); MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, 
NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 19–25 (2002); E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION 
AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 111–25 (2000); EDWARD PETER STRINGHAM, PRIVATE 
GOVERNANCE 193–204 (2015); PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY 1–9 (2007); James 
O. Freedman, Review: Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
307, 331–35 (1976); Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6, 19–20, 
30 (1988). See generally Symposium, New Forms of Governance: Ceding Public Power to 
Private Actors, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (2002) (analyzing the transition of government power to 
private actors); Symposium, Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the 
Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1307 (2001) (focusing on the debate about the 
movement toward privatization of activities that have previously been governmental in nature).   
 46. See, e.g., DONNELLY, supra note 45, at 118–26; VERKUIL, supra note 45, at 102–12; 
Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their 
Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 169 (1989); Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: 
Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 498 (1988); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn 
in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 
142–43 (2000); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 228, 248 
(1937); Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers 
Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 331, 333–34 (1998); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional 
Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 
67 (1990); David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 648–
50 (1986); George W. Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 
50 IND. L.J. 650, 652, 655, 711–12 (1975); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1411, 1437–44, 1480, 1486 (2003); Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo 
with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 
1029, 1031 (2005); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the 
Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 457 n.199 (2000); Paul R. Verkuil, 
Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 422 
(2006); Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-
Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 940, 944 (2014); Note, 
The Validity of Ordinances Limiting Condominium Conversion, 78 MICH. L. REV. 124, 135–36 
(1979); Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private 
Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751, 762, 765 (2013) [hereinafter Note, The Vagaries of 
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important because, in some ways, handing governmental power over to 
private parties is an even greater threat to democracy and accountability 
than is the older, better known practice of delegating that authority to 
federal government officials. The basic legal issue that private delegation 
raises is whether Congress, states, and localities can delegate 
governmental power to parties who are neither legally nor politically 
accountable for their actions to an Executive Branch official or to the 
public.47  
The last century has also witnessed litigation addressing the legality 
of private delegations, albeit far less than what has occurred regarding its 
public sibling. The Supreme Court dipped its toe in the private delegation 
water during the 1920s and early 1930s, but after the mid-1930s decided 
not to go any further.48 The Court’s reluctance to rigorously scrutinize 
private delegations could have been due to the Court’s belief that the 
judiciary should not second-guess Congress’s decisions on how to 
allocate decision-making responsibility for social and economic welfare 
judgments.49 Yet, five years ago in Department of Transportation v. 
Association of American Railroads (Amtrak II),50 Justices Clarence 
Thomas and Samuel Alito expressed their willingness to revisit the 
Private Delegation Doctrine and enforce the Court’s precedents 
prohibiting that practice.51 Justices Thomas and Alito found it 
unnecessary to resolve that issue in the case, however, because they 
agreed with the majority that, for this purpose at least, Amtrak was an 
arm of the federal government.52 Nonetheless, the Justices gave notice 
that they did not believe that the Private Delegation Doctrine was either 
“mostly dead” or “all dead.” 
They were right to do so. As explained below, delegating lawmaking 
or law-implementing authority to private parties might not materially 
differ from immunizing government officials against legal challenges 
when they perform their assigned functions. To date, society has been 
 
Vagueness]; Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Groups, 67 
HARV. L. REV. 1398, 1398 (1954). 
 47. See Verkuil, supra note 46, at 422. 
 48. See Liebmann, supra note 46, at 652; Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness, supra note 46, 
at 764. 
 49. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731–32 (1963) (“We refuse to sit as a 
‘superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,’ and we emphatically refuse to go back to 
the time when courts used the Due Process Clause ‘to strike down state laws, regulatory of 
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony 
with a particular school of thought.’” (footnote omitted) (first quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. 
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952); then quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 
488 (1955))). 
 50. 575 U.S. 43 (2015). 
 51. Id. at 56–66 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 66–90 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 52. Id. at 66 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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reluctant to grant public officials such immunity, with good reason. That 
reluctance stems from the norm that a society committed to governance 
under the rule of law cannot exempt the people who make or execute 
those laws from the responsibility to comply borne by the rest of society. 
Government officials, therefore, must be held legally or politically 
accountable. There doubtless are benefits from enlisting private parties to 
provide numerous goods and services that the government could leave to 
those parties and the private market to generate. Yet, allowing private 
parties the final say when exercising the same coercion that government 
officials cannot exercise with impunity goes too far. It would, in fact, 
violate the Due Process Clause altogether to exempt someone exercising 
delegated government power from compliance with the law. 
That is the thesis of this Article. Constitutionally speaking, Congress 
and the states may delegate public authority to private parties if they are 
accountable under the law to the people over whom they exercise it—that 
is, as long as affected parties can seek relief in the courts under the 
common law. Otherwise, Congress would violate the threshold guarantee 
of the Due Process Clauses and Magna Carta: all government officials 
are subject to the rule of law. The three occasions in which the Supreme 
Court has struck down a private delegation involved a type of authorized 
lawlessness. By contrast, every private delegation upheld by the Court 
has required a government official to sign off on what a private party 
decided. In that way, the Private Delegation Doctrine is a simple 
application and reinforcement of the rule of law. Congress and the states 
may decide the extent to which they will involve private parties in the 
process of governance, but neither the federal nor state government can 
do so by allowing a private party to take the law into its own hands.  
Presidencies and Congresses come and go, but government is not 
likely to disappear any time soon. Privatization will remain only a matter 
of “molar to molecular motions”53 for the foreseeable future. The 
questions of whether and, if so, how the United States should make 
marginal changes in the ratio between government and private 
responsibilities is a difficult one to answer and is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Besides, the question whether the government may and, if so, 
how it may grant state power to private parties is more than enough to 
chew on. 
The discussion below proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the Private 
Delegation Doctrine. In private delegation cases, Congress—or a state or 
local body—has delegated rulemaking or adjudicatory power outside the 
legal framework governing the exercise of government power, which 
 
 53. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting), superseded by 
statute, Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWA), ch. 509, 44 Stat. 
1424 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 902–950), as recognized in Director v. Perini 
N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297 (1983). 
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raises concerns that the Public Delegation Doctrine does not. Part II then 
discusses why Congress and states delegate governmental authority to 
public and private parties, as well as why the Supreme Court has refused 
to curtail such delegations. Part III explains why private delegation raises 
issues under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Those provisions serve a critical role in understanding the 
concerns underlying private delegations, as well as the restraints that the 
rule of law requires for their legality. Part IV uses the approach discussed 
in Part III to analyze two problem areas for private delegation: (1) the 
dynamic incorporation of private rules or foreign law and (2) the 
privatization of different features of the criminal justice system, such as 
the use of private jails and prisons.  
I.  THE SUPREME COURT’S PRIVATE DELEGATION DECISIONS 
The Supreme Court has discussed the constitutionality of private 
delegations on far fewer occasions than it has addressed the vesting of 
similar authority in government officers. Moreover, although the Court 
has held some such delegations unconstitutional, those decisions are 
more than eighty years old.54 Since then, the Court has upheld every 
statutory scheme involving private parties in the government’s decision-
making process in one capacity or another.55 Consequently, courts cannot 
avoid answering the question whether the Supreme Court’s early 
decisions are still “good law.” The academy has debated that issue 
without reaching a unanimous conclusion. Accordingly, it makes sense 
to start at the beginning, with the Court’s 1912 decision in Eubank v. City 
of Richmond.56  
A.  The Early Decisions 
Eubank involved a municipal land use ordinance. Richmond passed 
an ordinance, enforceable by a fine, authorizing parties who owned two-
thirds of the property on any street to establish a building line barring 
further house construction past the line and requiring modification of 
existing structures to conform to that line.57 The Supreme Court ruled that 
the ordinance violated the Due Process Clause because it created utterly 
 
 54. See Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 144 (1912); Washington ex rel. Seattle 
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 
311 (1936). 
 55. See, e.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 11 (1939); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. 
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 
107–08 (1978); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 677 (1976); Haw. 
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984). 
 56. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).  
 57. Id. at 141. 
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no standard for the property owners to use and permitted them to act for 
their self-interest or arbitrarily.58  
The next case came shortly after Eubank. Thomas Cusack Co. v. City 
of Chicago59 was the mirror image of Eubank. Chicago adopted a 
municipal ordinance prohibiting the erection and maintenance of 
commercial billboards in primarily residential neighborhoods unless a 
majority of the owners of the frontage property gave their written 
consent.60 Relying on Eubank, an outdoor advertising company claimed 
that the Chicago ordinance was unconstitutional.61 The Court rejected as 
 
 58. In the Court’s words: 
[The ordinance] leaves no discretion in the committee on streets as to 
whether the street line shall or shall not be established in a given case. The action 
of the committee is determined by two-thirds of the property owners. In other 
words, part of the property owners fronting on the block determine the extent of 
use that other owners shall make of their lots, and against the restriction they are 
impotent. This we emphasize. One set of owners determine not only the extent 
of use but the kind of use which another set of owners may make of their 
property. In what way is the public safety, convenience or welfare served by 
conferring such power? The statute and ordinance, while conferring the power 
on some property holders to virtually control and dispose of the property rights 
of others, creates no standard by which the power thus given is to be exercised; 
in other words, the property holders who desire and have the authority to 
establish the line may do so solely for their own interest or even capriciously. 
Taste (for even so arbitrary a thing as taste may control) or judgment may vary 
in localities, indeed, in the same locality. There may be one taste or judgment of 
comfort or convenience on one side of a street and a different one on the other. 
There may be diversity in other blocks; and viewing them in succession, their 
building lines may be continuous or staggering (to adopt a word of the 
mechanical arts) as the interests of certain of the property owners may prompt 
against the interests of others. The only discretion, we have seen, which exists in 
the Street Committee or in the Committee of Public Safety, is in the location of 
the line, between five and thirty feet. It is hard to understand how public comfort 
or convenience, much less public health, can be promoted by a line which may 
be so variously disposed. 
Id. at 143–44. 
 59. 242 U.S. 526 (1917). 
 60. Id. at 527–28.  
 61. Id. at 530–31 (“The plaintiff in error relies chiefly upon Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 
137. A sufficient distinction between the ordinance there considered and the one at bar is plain. 
The former left the establishment of the building line untouched until the lot owners should act 
and then made the street committee the mere automatic register of that action and gave to it the 
effect of law. The ordinance in the case at bar absolutely prohibits the erection of any billboards 
in the blocks designated, but permits this prohibition to be modified with the consent of the 
persons who are to be most affected by such modification. The one ordinance permits two-thirds 
of the lot owners to impose restrictions upon the other property in the block, while the other 
permits one-half of the lot owners to remove a restriction from the other property owners. This is 
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“palpably frivolous” the company’s argument that the ordinance 
unconstitutionally delegated governmental power to private parties, 
explaining that the company “cannot be injured, but obviously may be 
benefited by this provision, for without it the prohibition of the erection 
of such billboards in such residence sections is absolute.”62  
In 1928, the Court revisited the problem in Washington ex rel. Seattle 
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge.63 In Roberge, a trustee of a home for the 
elderly poor sought a permit to enlarge the facility to house additional 
residents.64 The trustee, however, faced an obstacle. A Seattle zoning 
ordinance limited buildings in the vicinity to single-family homes, public 
and certain private schools, churches, parks, and the like, but empowered 
the city to grant a zoning variance if at least one-half of the nearby 
property owners consented.65 The city building superintendent denied the 
permit because the adjacent property owners had not consented, and the 
trustee sued.66 Relying on Eubank, the Court held that, while zoning 
ordinances are generally valid, the Seattle ordinance was unconstitutional 
as applied in those circumstances because it enabled the nearby property 
owners to deny a variance for their own, capricious reasons.67 The Court 
explained that Seattle, like Richmond, cannot hand zoning power to 
private parties.68  
 
not a delegation of legislative power, but is, as we have seen, a familiar provision affecting the 
enforcement of laws and ordinances.”).  
 62. See id. at 527, 531. 
 63. 278 U.S. 116 (1928). 
 64. Id. at 117.  
 65. Id. at 118 n.*.  
 66. Id. at 119. 
 67. See id. at 122–23. 
 68. Id. at 121–22 (“The right of the trustee to devote its land to any legitimate use is properly 
within the protection of the Constitution. The facts disclosed by the record make it clear that the 
exclusion of the new home from the first district is not indispensable to the general zoning plan. 
And there is no legislative determination that the proposed building and use would be inconsistent 
with public health, safety, morals or general welfare. The enactment itself plainly implies the 
contrary. The grant of permission for such building and use, although purporting to be subject to 
such consents, shows that the legislative body found that the construction and maintenance of the 
new home was in harmony with the public interest and with the general scope and plan of the 
zoning ordinance. The section purports to give the owners of less than one-half the land within 
400 feet of the proposed building authority—uncontrolled by any standard or rule prescribed by 
legislative action—to prevent the trustee from using its land for the proposed home. The 
superintendent is bound by the decision or inaction of such owners. There is no provision for 
review under the ordinance; their failure to give consent is final. They are not bound by any 
official duty, but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may subject the 
trustee to their will or caprice. The delegation of power so attempted is repugnant to the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
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Eight years later came the last case to invalidate a private delegation, 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.69 Carter Coal involved a delegation challenge 
 
The Thomas Cusack Co. and Roberge cases point in opposite directions, and it is difficult to 
reconcile them. But several factors indicate that Eubank and Roberge are still good law: Roberge, 
which postdates Thomas Cusack Co., expressly relies on Eubank. The Supreme Court expressly 
relied on Eubank in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311–12 (1936), which held 
unconstitutional Congress’s delegation of federal authority to private parties. See infra note 75 
and accompanying text. Lastly, post-Carter Supreme Court decisions distinguished Eubank rather 
than jettison it. See cases cited infra notes 81–87. 
 69. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). After it decided Roberge but before it resolved Carter Coal, the 
Supreme Court decided another relevant case, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935). Schechter Poultry involved a delegation challenge to the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195. Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 519. At issue 
was a provision—title I, section 3(a)–(b)—that delegated to trade or industrial groups the 
authority to define “unfair method[s] of competition” that would become law only when approved 
by the President under “such exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of such code, as 
the President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy herein declared.” Id. at 
521 n.4, 534 (quoting § 3(a)–(b)). Untroubled by the breadth of a judgment holding the NIRA 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s delegation went too far. See id. at 541–
42.  
The Court held the delegation unconstitutional. Id. at 542. The statement of purposes set forth 
elsewhere in the NIRA did not limit the scope of the delegation, the Court reasoned, because the 
NIRA empowered private parties to define that term for their own benefit by protecting 
themselves against competition by rivals. Id. at 537 (“But would it be seriously contended that 
Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as 
to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and 
expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be 
constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar 
with the problems of their enterprises? And, could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a 
preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section 1 of title I? The answer is 
obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent 
with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”). Finally, the Court found of no 
moment the NIRA requirement that the President approve an unfair competition code before it 
could take effect. See id. at 538–42. (Of course, perhaps the Court gave no weight to that 
presidential approval requirement because, given the massive number of codes, amendments, and 
the like, the Court did not believe that the President had actually reviewed them. The Schechter 
Poultry opinion does not express that disbelief, of course, but that may be merely because the 
Justices thought it impolitic or impolite to call President Roosevelt a liar.) The Court implicitly 
assumed that the President would approve or reject each individual code presented to him but 
found that the NIRA did not supply him with an intelligible principle to use when making those 
decisions. See id. at 538–39. In the Court’s view, the NIRA did not cabin the President’s discretion 
because it left him free to “roam at will” to “approve or disapprove” a cartel’s proposals “as he 
may see fit,” id. at 538, over “a host of different trades and industries, thus extending the 
President’s discretion to all the varieties of laws which he may deem to be beneficial in dealing 
with the vast array of commercial and industrial activities throughout the country,” id. at 539. 
Congress’s unprecedented delegation of authority, the Court concluded, exceeded Article I 
limitations. Id. at 541–42. Schechter Poultry sounds like a private delegation case, but the Court 
was careful to acknowledge that President Roosevelt had the final call. 
 
350717-FLR_73-1_Text.indd   58 2/22/21   10:31 AM
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol73/iss1/2
2021] THE PRIVATE DELEGATION DOCTRINE 49 
 
to a federal law, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.70 
Among other things, the act authorized the district board in local coal 
districts to adopt a code that included agreed-upon minimum and 
maximum prices for coal that would automatically become law.71 The 
Act also allowed an agreement between producers of more than two-
thirds of the annual tonnage of coal and a majority of mine workers to set 
industry-wide wage and maximum working hour agreements.72 
Shareholders of coal producers outside of the agreements brought suit 
against the federal government, maintaining that the act 
unconstitutionally delegated congressional power to private parties.73 
Relying on Eubank and Roberge, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act unconstitutionally delegated federal 
governmental power.74 Describing that act as “legislative delegation in 
its most obnoxious form,” the Court held that it arbitrarily interfered with 
a coal producer’s property rights by vesting governmental power in the 
hands of a party interested in the outcome of a business transaction.75 
 
 70. Ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991 (repealed 1937).  
 71. See Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 280–83.  
 72. Id. at 283–84.  
 73. Id. at 278–79. 
 74. Id. at 311–12. 
 75. Id. at 311. The Court explained, 
The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to regulate the 
affairs of an unwilling minority. This is legislative delegation in its most 
obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, 
presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and 
often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business. The record shows 
that the conditions of competition differ among the various localities. In some, 
coal dealers compete among themselves. In other localities, they also compete 
with the mechanical production of electrical energy and of natural gas. Some 
coal producers favor the code; others oppose it; and the record clearly indicates 
that this diversity of view arises from their conflicting and even antagonistic 
interests. The difference between producing coal and regulating its production 
is, of course, fundamental. The former is a private activity; the latter is 
necessarily a governmental function, since, in the very nature of things, one 
person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the business of another, 
and especially of a competitor. And a statute which attempts to confer such 
power undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal 
liberty and private property. The delegation is so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly 
a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions of this court which 
foreclose the question.  
Id. at 311–12 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); 
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143 (1912); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust 
Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121–22 (1928)). 
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Like Eubank and Roberge, Carter Coal stands for the proposition that the 
legislature cannot vest government power in private parties who are 
neither legally nor politically accountable to other government officials 
or to the electorate. 
An interesting feature of Eubank, Roberge, and Carter Coal is the lack 
of a detailed explanation of why those delegations were unconstitutional 
and the absence of a clear common denominator for all three decisions. 
In Eubank and Roberge, the Court held the challenged city ordinances 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.76 
Eubank and Roberge were state cases, so the Article I Vesting Clause and 
Public Delegation Doctrine could not have restricted a state’s discretion 
on whether and how to assign lawmaking power.77 By contrast, the 
Court’s public delegation cases involved Legislative Vesting Clause 
claims. Schechter Poultry involved a delegation by the NIRA to the 
President of the power to adopt as law codes of conduct proposed by 
private organizations, which clearly raised a Legislative Vesting Clause 
issue.78 Moreover, the Court discussed the constitutionality of that 
delegation under the standard set forth in J.W. Hampton, which involved 
a Legislative Vesting Clause challenge to a federal tariff act.79 Finally, in 
Carter Coal the Court found it unnecessary to discuss in any detail why 
the Constitution prohibited the private delegation that the Bituminous 
Coal Conservation Act of 1935 accomplished. In so finding, the Court 
simply cited its decisions in Schechter Poultry, Eubank, and Roberge as 
sufficient precedent to justify its decision, implying that both the 
Legislative Vesting and Due Process Clauses prohibited that delegation.80 
Thus, the implication from Carter Coal is that both clauses forbid a 
legislative grant of unreviewable lawmaking authority to public officials 
or private parties.  
B.  The Later Decisions 
The Supreme Court has revisited the Private Delegation Doctrine on 
only a handful of occasions since Carter Coal. In each case, the Supreme 
Court upheld the vesting of state authority in private parties. The laws at 
 
 76. See Roberge, 278 U.S. at 122 (“The delegation of power so attempted is repugnant to 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing Eubank, 226 U.S. at 143)). 
 77. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612–13 (1937) (rejecting 
a delegation challenge to a state milk marketing order because “[h]ow power shall be distributed 
by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for the state 
itself” and “[n]othing in the distribution here attempted supplies the basis for an exception”). 
 78. See 295 U.S. at 521–22. 
 79. Id. at 541–42. 
 80. See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311–12. 
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issue in each of those cases, however, left final decision-making authority 
in the hands of a government official.  
For example, in Currin v. Wallace81 the Court upheld a regulatory 
program authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to approve regional 
tobacco quality standards if two-thirds of the affected growers 
recommended them.82 The Court’s decision in Sunshine Anthracite Coal 
Co. v. Adkins83 upheld a coal regulatory act that permitted local coal 
producers to recommend rules governing coal sales, but left to a 
government board the power to approve, disapprove, or modify the 
private recommendations.84 New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox 
Co.85 rejected a due process delegation challenge to a state law directing 
a state agency to decide whether to delay the opening of a new motor 
vehicle franchise establishment or location when an existing dealer 
objected.86 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff87 rejected the argument 
that due process prohibits a state from allowing private parties to initiate 
the eminent domain condemnation process.88 In each case, the Court 
reasoned that there was no true delegation of government authority. A 
private party could initiate the process leading to a government official 
deciding whether and how to exercise governmental authority, but only a 
government official had the final say.  
So, where does that leave things? The bottom line is this: Relying on 
the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court held three private delegations 
unconstitutional between 1912 and 1936, and each case suggested that 
only government officials may exercise governmental power. Since then, 
however, the Court has upheld every public–private government 
decision-making arrangement a legislature has adopted as long as a 
government official had the final word. The Court has followed that path 
without examining the type or amount of scrutiny that the responsible 
government official actually undertook to determine whether he 
performed a serious evaluation of the private decision submitted to him 
or just rubber-stamped it. Scholars could not be faulted for throwing clods 
of earth atop the Private Delegation Doctrine.89 
 
 81. 306 U.S. 1 (1939). 
 82. Id. at 15–18. 
 83. 310 U.S. 381 (1940). 
 84. Id. at 388, 399. 
 85. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).  
 86. Id. at 106. 
 87. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 88. Id. at 243 n.6. 
 89. See Metzger, supra note 46, at 1440–41 (“Yet while Carter’s constitutional prohibition 
on private delegations thus remains alive in theory, it is all but dead in practice. Almost all private 
delegations are upheld. Courts are satisfied by formal provision for government ratification, 
however perfunctory. The private delegations that have been sustained often involve substantial 
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Why has the Private Delegation Doctrine (apparently) flatlined? The 
reason is not known for certain, but two possibilities come to mind. One 
is that legislatures have learned lessons from Eubank, Roberge, and 
Carter Coal on how to delegate government power and have thus made 
sure that some government official must endorse whatever decision 
private parties reach. In cases like Eubank, the government had no 
discretion to reject or modify the decision made by private parties.90 By 
contrast, the Court’s recent decisions in cases like Currin, Adkins, Fox, 
and Midkiff involved a regulatory scheme in which a government official 
was ultimately responsible for exercising state authority. That distinction 
is formulistic, but is important nonetheless. Even where a public official 
engages in the “perfunctory” ratification of a private decision,91 the 
presence of governmental action has benefits for both anyone injured and 
the public: It triggers federal constitutional protections that no legislature 
can evade, it provides political accountability for government decisions, 
and it identifies the responsible party against whom a plaintiff can seek 
judicial relief.92 Maybe legislatures have so incorporated that principle 
into their own decision-making that the Private Delegation Doctrine has 
gone the way of the Third Amendment’s ban on the quartering of soldiers 
in private homes93—it has become a principle so thoroughly accepted that 
no one would consider violating it today. Another explanation might be 
that the Court has decided to group Eubank, Roberge, and Carter Coal 
into other pre-New Deal Era decisions—Lochner v. New York94 is the best 
example—that unlawfully intruded on a legislature’s power to define 
 
direct control over third parties; even seemingly limited delegations that simply grant private 
entities the power to trigger government action, such as the ability to force an administrative 
hearing or commence a civil penalty action, can be quite significant. Interestingly, many decisions 
examining private delegations at the federal level use essentially the same framework as is applied 
to ‘public’ delegations—that is, legislative grants of power to the executive branch—thereby 
suggesting that the Court sees such private delegations as presenting nothing beyond ordinary 
separation of powers issues.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 90. See Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143 (1912) (“[The Richmond 
ordinance] leaves no discretion in the committee on streets as to whether the street line shall or 
shall not be established in a given case.”). 
 91. Metzger, supra note 46, at 1440. 
 92. At least, no legislature can evade if, for example, the Due Process Clause restrains the 
government from zoning out federal constitutional challenges to government action, an issue that 
scholars have debated for decades. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail 
Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 
899–900 (1984); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ 
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 17–21 (1981). 
That issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 93. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”). 
 94. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 
350717-FLR_73-1_Text.indd   62 2/22/21   10:31 AM
22
Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol73/iss1/2
2021] THE PRIVATE DELEGATION DOCTRINE 53 
 
what is in the public interest.95 Said differently, just as the Supreme Court 
has decided to leave the merits of economic and social judgments to the 
political decision-making process, so, too, has the Court chosen not to 
second-guess political decisions regarding the structure of that process.  
Neither explanation, however, is completely satisfactory. Consider the 
first one. There is no desuetude doctrine in Anglo-American law.96 A 
Supreme Court decision remains the law until the Court itself inters it.97 
Besides, legislatures occasionally forget (or conveniently ignore) the 
teaching of Eubank, Roberge, and Carter Coal by enacting regulatory 
schemes that do vest governmental power in private hands.98 Several of 
those delegations have made their way into the courts, and some judges, 
state court judges in particular,99 have found them constitutionally 
objectionable.100 
The second explanation also leaves something to be desired. Recently, 
the Supreme Court has been quite willing to strictly enforce other, non-
 
 95. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147 (1938) (“Hence Congress 
is free to exclude from interstate commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are 
destined it may reasonably conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, or 
which contravene the policy of the state of their destination.” (citations omitted)). 
 96. See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 113–14 (1953) (“The 
failure of the executive branch to enforce a law does not result in its modification or repeal. The 
repeal of laws is as much a legislative function as their enactment.” (citations omitted)); 
THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 337–38 (Little, Brown & 
Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929) (concluding that English common law never allowed “room for any 
theory that statutes might become obsolete”); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Finding Room in the Criminal 
Law for the Desuetude Principle, RUTGERS L. REV. COMMENTS., Mar. 11, 2014, at 1, 7 (“[T]he 
desuetude doctrine has not garnered much support in America’s legal system. Anglo-American 
law has rejected it for ages, and only one state appears to give it any weight today.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 97. See, e.g., Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2016) (per curiam) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t is this Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents . . . .” (quoting 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997))). 
 98. See, e.g., Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA), Pub. L. 
No. 110-432, Div. B, sec. 202, § 24302, 122 Stat. 4848, 4907, 4911 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 
§ 24302) (establishing private control of Amtrak); Volokh, supra note 46, at 963–70 (discussing 
state law private delegation doctrines); cf. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. (Amtrak II), 
575 U.S. 43, 46 (2015) (discussed infra at notes 105–110); In re President’s Comm’n on 
Organized Crime Subpoena of Scarfo, 783 F.2d 370, 371, 380 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that 
Congress could grant subpoena power to a presidential advisory commission created by an 
executive order).  
 99. See Volokh, supra note 46, at 963–70 (discussing state law private delegation 
doctrines). 
 100. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (Amtrak III), 821 F.3d 19, 31 
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (“We conclude . . . that the due process of law is violated when a self-interested 
entity is ‘intrusted with the power to regulate the business . . . of a competitor.’” (quoting Carter 
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936))), supplemented as to remedy, Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (Amtrak IV), 896 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  
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Article I constitutional restraints on the structure of decision-making 
responsibility. Specifically, the Court has struck down as unconstitutional 
Congress’s decisions that did not comply with the Article II Recognition 
and Appointments Clauses,101 along with the Article III Judicial Power 
Clause,102 on the ground that even a modern-day Congress must comply 
with the Framers’ allocation of authority. If the Due Process Clause also 
poses a restraint on Congress’s power to delegate authority to private 
parties, there is no reason to assume that the Court will refuse to apply it. 
Accordingly, the Court is likely to be asked to decide whether Eubank, 
Roberge, and Carter Coal remain good law. In fact, the Court almost did 
just that five years ago in the Amtrak II case.  
C.  The Amtrak Decision 
In Amtrak II, an association representing railroads challenged the 
constitutionality of a provision of the Passenger Rail Investment and 
Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA).103 The provision directed the Federal 
Railroad Administration and the National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation, commonly known as Amtrak, in consultation with the 
Surface Transportation Board, rail carriers, and other private parties, to 
“develop new or improve existing metrics and minimum standards for 
measuring the performance and service quality of intercity passenger 
train operations.”104 Those metrics and standards were not simply 
advisory. Rather, they were to become part of the access and service 
agreements Amtrak and its host rail carriers adopted and could play a role 
in investigations and enforcements actions the Surface Transportation 
Board undertook.105 The railroad association alleged that the PRIIA was 
 
 101. See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020) (holding that the 
“[Consumer Financial Protection Bureau]’s leadership by a single individual removable only for 
inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers” under Article II of the 
Constitution); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018) (holding that the Article II 
Appointments Clause governs the appointment of SEC administrative law judges); Zivotofksy v. 
Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 17–21 (2015) (holding that the Article II Reception Clause prohibits Congress 
from deciding whether to grant formal recognition to a foreign sovereign); Free Enter. Fund v. 
Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–93 (2010) (holding that the Article II 
Appointments Clause prohibits the imposition of a dual-level for-cause removal requirement). 
 102. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 469 (2011) (holding that the Article III 
Judicial Power Clause prohibits Congress from empowering federal bankruptcy courts to decide 
certain state law counterclaims). 
 103. Pub. L. No. 110-432, Div. B, 122 Stat. 4848, 4907 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 24302); see 
Amtrak II, 575 U.S. at 50. The PRIIA was a component of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, 122 Stat. 4848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C.).  
 104. Sec. 207(a), 122 Stat. at 4916. 
 105. See Amtrak II, 575 U.S. at 48–49. 
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unconstitutional because it delegated federal regulatory authority to 
Amtrak, a private entity.106 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit agreed with the association, but the Supreme Court reversed.107  
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy reasoned that 
Amtrak may be a private party for some purposes, but was a 
governmental entity for the standard-setting purposes of the PRIIA.108 
The majority therefore did not address the private delegation argument 
the D.C. Circuit endorsed because the Court decided that Amtrak was a 
public entity for that purpose. Justice Alito, however, addressed the 
Private Delegation Doctrine in a concurring opinion, concluding, without 
any apparent difficulty, that decisions such as Carter Coal are still good 
law and that Congress cannot delegate regulatory power to a private 
party.109 Justice Thomas would have gone even further. Notably, he 
concluded that the Court’s entire delegation jurisprudence was mistaken 
and that, in a proper case, the Court should reconsider it.110 
Although the Amtrak II case did not resolve the question of whether 
the Private Delegation Doctrine remains vital, the issue is likely to 
resurface.111 Government officials delegate decision-making authority to 
private parties to take advantage of supposed efficiencies that come from 
having private companies manage government projects and as a way of 
deflecting blame to the recipients of that authority should matters turn out 
badly. As explained below, however, the two doctrines are materially 
different from each other. The delegation of lawmaking, law-applying, or 
law-adjudicating power to a private party raises a variety of issues that 
do not come up when a federal official possesses that authority.  
This Article argues that a private delegation is unconstitutional not 
because it violates Article I, II, or III, and not because it violates 
separation of powers principles that can be inferred from our three-part 
division of government. Nor is a private delegation unconstitutional 
because it poses an unacceptable risk of bias (although it certainly does). 
Instead, a private delegation is unconstitutional because it is an attempt 
to evade the structural, substantive, and procedural guarantees that 
 
 106. Id. at 45–46. 
 107. Id. at 46. 
 108. Id. at 55.  
 109. Id. at 61–64 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 110. Id. at 91 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 111. On remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in Amtrak II, the D.C. Circuit held that 
the private delegation was unconstitutional under Carter Coal because it gave self-interested 
private parties the authority to adversely affect the interests of others. Amtrak III, 821 F.3d 19, 
27–31 (D.C. Cir. 2016), supplemented as to remedy, Amtrak IV, 896 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
Following additional proceedings in the district court, the D.C. Circuit issued a final judgment in 
the summer of 2018 excising certain provisions in the PRIIA (dealing with binding arbitration) to 
remedy the constitutional flaw in the act. Amtrak IV, 896 F.3d at 551. 
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constitutional law imposes on officials who exercise governmental 
power. 
II.  RECONSIDERING THE LEGALITY OF PRIVATE DELEGATIONS 
The civics answer to the legitimacy of private delegations might be: 
“Why not?” After all, the opening words of the Constitution reflect the 
theory that the people are the ultimate sovereign. The first seven words 
introduce the Constitution by identifying who is responsible for that 
charter’s adoption as our nation’s fundamental law: “We the People of 
the United States.”112 If the people are the ultimate source of 
governmental authority, the argument goes, a law that returns some of 
that authority from whence it came is doubtless constitutional. For that 
reason, the Supreme Court has twice rejected delegation challenges to 
state laws that reserve certain changes in the law to local referenda.113 
Public referenda, the Court explained, are not delegations of authority to 
private parties; they are a retention of decision-making authority by the 
public. As the Supreme Court has put it, public referenda are “a basic 
instrument of democratic government” and “an exercise by the voters of 
their traditional right through direct legislation to override the views of 
their elected representatives as to what serves the public interest.”114 
What is more, there are considerable benefits from privatizing 
government functions, such as increased efficiency and public 
participation in governance, so the decision to return power to private 
parties is not an arbitrary one. In any event, it is too late in the day, the 
argument concludes, to hold invalid long-standing, widely used practices 
like those. 
Like most civics answers, however, that one does not reflect the 
political realities of contemporary society. To determine whether private 
delegation is a legitimate tool of self-governance and whether it benefits 
the public or simply empowers its recipients, it is necessary to understand 
why Congress and other governments delegate lawmaking power to 
private parties, as well as the risks and rewards private delegation poses. 
Section II.A provides this necessary understanding. It turns out that (at 
 
 112. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“That 
the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in 
their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole 
American fabric has been erected.”); MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 112 (David Wallace 
Carrithers ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748) (stating that, in a democracy, political power 
resides in the electorate). 
 113. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (upholding a 
referendum process challenged under Eubank on the ground that it was a “reservation” of power, 
rather than a “delegation”); see also City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 
U.S. 188, 199 (2003) (relying on City of Eastlake to reject a similar challenge).  
 114. City of Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 678–79 (quoting S. Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. 
Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970)). 
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least) two factors encourage Congress to delegate problem-solving 
elsewhere. The first factor is the difficulty of resolving medical, 
scientific, or technical problems, coupled with the political risk from 
reaching the wrong initial decision. The second factor is the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to engage in the type of undirected line drawing that 
traditional delegation jurisprudence requires the Court to pursue when 
telling Congress that it has delegated too much lawmaking power. 
A.  Why Congress Delegates Lawmaking Power 
A powerful justification for delegation is the increasing sophistication 
of contemporary scientific and technical challenges facing contemporary 
America. For example, the onset of artificial intelligence,115 the outbreak 
of new forms of serious viral diseases or the movement of old ones 
beyond their historic borders,116 and the study and exploitation of the 
microbiome117—those developments (and others yet to emerge) that no 
one could have anticipated in 1787—are only a few of the uncertainties 
society has already confronted in the twenty-first century. The successful 
negotiation of such problems demands far more knowledge, skill, and 
experience than the average person or legislator can muster.118 At the 
same time, old problems—such as deciding what is a “drug” and what 
drugs are “safe” and “effective”—have not disappeared or become 
decidedly less difficult.119 Indeed, the encouraging development of 
 
 115. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, How Do You Govern Machines That Can Learn? Policymakers 
Are Trying to Figure That Out, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
01/20/technology/artificial-intelligence-policy-world.html [https://perma.cc/7DK2-M9AM]. 
 116. See, e.g., Bridget M. Kuehn, Lessons Learned from SARS Outbreak Prompt Rapid 
Response to New Coronavirus, 309 JAMA 1576, 1576 (2013); Timothy M. Uyeki et al., Clinical 
Management of Ebola Virus Disease in the United States and Europe, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 636, 
637 (2016). 
 117. That is, “the community of bacteria, fungi, and viruses in an environment.” See, e.g., 
Catriona P. Harkins et al., Manipulating the Human Microbiome to Manage Disease, 323 JAMA 
303, 303 (2020). 
 118. The average American lacks a college degree, let alone the advanced medical or 
scientific education and training that research in those fields demands. CAMILLE L. RYAN & KURT 
BAUMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 1, 2 
tbl.1 (2016). 
 119. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), ch. 675, §§ 201(g), 505, 
52 Stat. 1040, 1041, 1052 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399g) (defining “drug” and 
explaining that new drugs must be “safe”); Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 
Stat. 768 (prohibiting the manufacture or interstate shipment of adulterated or misbranded food 
and drugs); Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(a)(1), 76 Stat. 780, 781 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321) (requiring a manufacturer also to prove that a drug is 
“effective” before the company can market it in interstate commerce); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 
501, 529–30 (1912) (explaining how the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 defined “food”). The FDCA 
completely revamped the 1906 regulatory scheme and vested in the Commissioner of Food and 
Drugs, with the aid of his lieutenants in the newly created Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
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genetically specific medical treatments only complicates those 
decisions.120 To manage problems such as those, the argument goes, 
legislators must have some authority to let qualified third parties choose 
the best answer.121 The theoretical structure of the Constitution might not 
expressly permit tinkering along those lines, but, as Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes put it, “the machinery of government would not work if 
it were not allowed a little play in its joints.”122 If so, Congress is in a 
better position than the courts to decide what and how much authority it 
should hand off to experts. That conclusion is one of the principles that 
have undergirded the growth of agency governance, and it also has 
cogency when private parties have the necessary expertise. 
Privatization offers the benefits of specialization and expertise, as well 
as the promise of greater efficiency.123 Privatization also comes in many 
varieties. For instance, it could involve merely the off-the-shelf or special 
order purchase of goods and services—food, water, transportation, 
communications equipment, work apparel, and the like—from the private 
sector for use by federal officials, or it could entail the hiring of private 
contractors to supply services at federal buildings or military bases. Yet, 
privatization can also consist of outsourcing some functions ordinarily 
performed by government employees, such as engaging private 
companies to audit a government program, contracting with profit or 
nonprofit organizations to implement a government-funded program, 
hiring or underwriting private physicians to provide health care, or using 
private security companies for physical security of government facilities 
or officials.  
Several justifications have traditionally been offered for the argument 
that privatization is superior to the public provision of goods and 
 
the responsibility to determine whether drugs are “safe.” See CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL 
FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 24 (1938). See 
generally David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History 
and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2 (1939) (comparing the FDCA to the 
old Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906). For a discussion of the evidence that led to the 1906 
law, see JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF 
1906 (1989). 
 120. See, e.g., Ulrich Brinkmann & Roland E Kontermann, The Making of Biospecific 
Antibodies, 9 MABS 182, 182 (2017) (explaining biospecifc antibodies and their role in the 
pharmaceutical industry). 
 121. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political 
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 91–99 (1985) (describing how delegation to experts can lead 
to various benefits). 
 122. Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931). 
 123. Alex Kozinski & Andrew Bentz, Privatization and Its Discontents, 63 EMORY L.J. 263, 
264 (2013). 
 
350717-FLR_73-1_Text.indd   68 2/22/21   10:31 AM
28
Florida Law Review, Vol. 73, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol73/iss1/2
2021] THE PRIVATE DELEGATION DOCTRINE 59 
 
services.124 One justification is the belief that the government should rely 
on the market for goods and services where there is no market defect 
(such as externalities, public goods, or a natural monopoly) demanding 
public responsibility for an activity (such as national defense).125 A 
second justification is that the private sector can deliver goods, services, 
and ideas to government officials more quickly and efficiently without 
suffering any loss in quality because of the benefits of competition.126 
There is the hope that engaging private individuals in governance 
enhances the ability of different groups to be a part of participatory 
democracy.127 And then there is the belief that there are internal (profit-
driven) and external (government oversight) accountability mechanisms 
that are absent in the case of bureaucracies—which is also often 
expressed as the fear that government civil servants would reluctantly 
implement policies (if at all) that they find unwise, mistaken, or immoral 
and might actively pursue guerilla warfare to torpedo them.128 Those 
factors drive the belief that the private sector could become a Fifth Branch 
of government without the public suffering any adverse effect.  
Yet, there are also reasons for concern.129 Market imperfections, such 
as the free rider problem and natural monopolies, demand at least some 
minimal government involvement to protect private interests.130 
Privatization could weaken public norms such as the commitment to 
equality and concern for the vulnerable members of society.131 Distrust 
of the willingness of large corporations to prefer the public good over 
private profit also makes people unwilling to allow Congress to hand the 
keys to the government over to Omni Mega Corp. That is particularly true 
with regard to historic government operations. There is a strongly held 
 
 124. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and 
Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1423–30 (2003) (listing various benefits of privatization 
over public governance). 
 125. See id. at 1431–35. 
 126. See E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT 262–66 (1987); 
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE PROSPECTS FOR REINVENTING GOVERNMENT 20–22 (1994). 
 127. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
559–60 (2000). 
 128. See, e.g., ROSEMARY O’LEARY, THE ETHICS OF DISSENT 145–55 (3d ed. 2020) 
(describing public employees that purposely frustrate legislation and policy that they disagree 
with); Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 124, at 1448–49 (listing public accountability 
shortcomings). Events that have occurred during the Trump Administration prove the legitimacy 
of that concern. See, e.g., Opinion, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-
anonymous-resistance.html [https://perma.cc/YM8K-QX9Q]. 
 129. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 12, at 1246–55 (stating various shortcomings of 
privatization). 
 130. See, e.g., Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 124, at 1433–35. 
 131. See Minow, supra note 12, at 1230. 
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belief that only public officials should undertake certain “core” or 
“indispensable” government functions, such as operation of the criminal 
justice system. Protection of the public against violence by bandits and 
fraud by con artists is the foundational responsibility of a sovereign 
central government,132 and the inability to protect against such 
depredations is a defining feature of so-called failed states, such as Libya 
and Yemen.133 In fact, the Supreme Court once described the need for a 
state monopoly over violence through the criminal justice system as being 
“essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal 
processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs.”134 There is little 
to no constituency for completely privatizing government, yet the 
centrifugal force of privatization certainly has not let up. 
There are some dispiriting causes at work too. The Framers’ 
architecture rested on the premise that each branch of government would 
protect its particular institutional interests against the tendency of the 
others toward aggrandizement of their individual spheres of authority.135 
That theory, however, no longer reflects governance today. The Framers 
did not anticipate the political parties that now dominate the Washington, 
D.C. landscape, which have scrambled the Framers’ carefully constructed 
tripartite form of government.136 Party loyalty, especially to its 
leadership, is critical if members are to have any success as legislators, 
particularly in the House of Representatives, because “reforms” 
accomplished over the last forty-plus years have consolidated power in 
 
 132. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The instinct 
for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of 
criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by 
law.” (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring))); 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 108 (1993) (“Perhaps 
the most primitive and basic rules in the criminal justice system were those that protected property 
rights. . . . The laws against theft, larceny, embezzlement, and fraud are familiar friends.”); Paul 
J. Larkin, Jr. & GianCarlo Canaparo, Are Criminals Bad or Mad? Premeditated Murder, Mental 
Illness, and Kahler v. Kansas, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 148 (2020) (“At early common 
law, local English clans sanctioned offenders to prevent the violent retaliation that would follow 
if murders, assaults, and thefts were left unpunished and uncompensated. . . . However 
‘unappealing’ to some it might appear today to maintain that forestalling private vigilantism is a 
legitimate justification for punishment, that is the ground on which modern Anglo-American 
criminal law rested.” (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183)).  
 133. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1159, 1160–62 (2005). 
 134. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. 
 135. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 136. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2313 (2006). 
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the Speaker of the House and Senate Majority Leader.137 Representatives 
and Senators are more likely to defend their chief party officials, 
including the President, than the institutions to which they belong. 
The birth of two major political parties, along with the shift of power 
from committee chairs to House and Senate leadership, did not alone 
scuttle the Framers’ design. What also was needed was the loss of 
conservative and liberal wings, as well as middle-of-the-roaders, within 
each party. Compromise is possible when there are “fellow travelers” in 
each party, when there are members who straddle the line, and when some 
go back and forth depending on the issue. That feature, however, has 
largely disappeared from today’s political landscape. Over the last few 
decades, there has been an increasing polarization of each major political 
party, with the middle having shrunk to the point of almost disappearing. 
Political “debates” now more closely resemble the “Tastes great! Less 
filling!” television beer advertisements once seen during commercials at 
professional football games,138 or the inter-tribal bickering in Lawrence 
of Arabia,139 than the sharp but nonthreatening ripostes in Advise and 
Consent.140  
In addition, society has witnessed a fundamental change in the 
composition of the leading political parties. The Republican and 
Democratic Parties have realigned themselves into entities that are almost 
exclusively conservative or liberal. Congress now more closely 
resembles and acts as if it were the 2020 English Parliament than the First 
Congress. The legislature that the Framers envisioned in Philadelphia in 
1787 has morphed into a legislature with a Conservative–Liberal Party 
alignment unanticipated at the nation’s founding.141 Members try to make 
 
 137. For an insider’s explanation of what has happened, see Mike Gallagher, How to Salvage 
Congress, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/ 
gallagher-congress/575689/ [https://perma.cc/SF9J-UZJR].  
 138.  The Museum of Classic Chicago Television, Miller Lite - “The First Lite Beer Open” 
(Commercial, 1986), YOUTUBE (Feb. 22, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1mnBm 
fimpNY [https://perma.cc/2PY8-5ANR]. 
 139. niallkennedy, Table of Damascus in Lawrence of Arabia, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2006), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YhBIPZCVj84 [https://perma.cc/5FBQ-AUGL].  
 140. adam28xx, ‘Advise and Consent’ - Charles Laughton’s Last Movie, YOUTUBE (Nov. 
11, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0IMvWhR6B0 [https://perma.cc/YVS9-YMPM].  
141. Professors Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes explain,  
The Framers had not anticipated the nature of the democratic competition that 
would emerge in government and in the electorate. Political competition and 
cooperation along relatively stable lines of policy and ideological disagreement 
quickly came to be channeled not through the branches of government, but rather 
through an institution the Framers could imagine only dimly but nevertheless 
despised: political parties. As competition between the legislative and executive 
branches was displaced by competition between two major parties, the machine 
 
350717-FLR_73-1_Text.indd   71 2/22/21   10:31 AM
31
Larkin: The Private Delegation Doctrine
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
62 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
as few high-risk decisions as possible because each vote risks angering 
some portion of the electorate or their donors. In particular, no member 
wishes to antagonize a single-issue voting bloc, even a small one, because 
such groups can have a far greater effect on the political process than their 
numbers alone would suggest.142 The members’ fear of facing the voters’ 
wrath at the next election for having compromised on principle makes 
accommodation and compromise increasingly difficult to come by. For 
proof, consider what has happened to the congressional budget and 
appropriations processes. They have degenerated to the point that 
Congress now regularly funds the government’s operations via stopgap 
continuing resolutions simply to keep the three branches up and running 
rather than by passing regular appropriations bills.143 The result is that the 
Republican and Democratic Parties now resemble the Allied and Central 
Powers during the Great War—two equally matched armies facing each 
other across No Man’s Land, each one engaged in trench warfare, each 
one struggling to push forward, each one suffering heavy casualties in the 
process.  
 
that was supposed to go of itself stopped running.  
. . . In the Madisonian simulacrum of democratic politics embraced by 
constitutional doctrine and theory, the branches of government are personified 
as political actors with interests and wills of their own, entirely disconnected 
from the interests and wills of the officials who populate them or the citizens 
who elect those officials. Acting on these interests, the branches purportedly are 
locked in a perpetual struggle to aggrandize their own power and encroach upon 
their rivals. The kinds of partisan political competition that structure real-world 
democracy and dominate political discourse, however, are almost entirely 
missing from this picture. 
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 136, at 2313–14. Various commentators have attributed the current 
dysfunctional nature of Congress, at least in part, to that shift. See, e.g., YUVAL LEVIN, THE 
FRACTURED REPUBLIC 103 (2016); KENNETH R. MAYER & DAVID T. CANON, THE DYSFUNCTIONAL 
CONGRESS? 3 (1999). That criticism has much to say for itself. Today, our congressional 
representatives appear to spend more time preening for cameras and railing at congressional 
dysfunction than working together to overcome it. See, e.g., Yuval Levin, Congress Is Weak 
Because Its Members Want It To Be Weak, COMMENTARY (July/Aug. 2018), 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/congress-weak-members-want-weak/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2WPT-7SPJ].  
 142. See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5–6, 13–17, 16 
n.14 (1974) (arguing that participants in the political process will seek to further their own 
interests, rather than the “public interest” (quoting HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POWER AND 
PERSONALITY 38 (1948))); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 36 (rev. ed. 1971) 
(explaining why, according to collective action theory, a small coherent interest group with 
intensely held views on a single issue can have more legislative influence than a majority of the 
population). 
 143. See, e.g., Extension of Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-120, Div. 
B, 132 Stat. 28, 29. 
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That consequence plays right into the hands of members of Congress 
who desire to avoid accountability. As a political self-defense 
mechanism,144 members of Congress pass statutes that grant federal 
agencies broad or vaguely phrased authority to issue rules governing 
private conduct as substitutes for hard-fought legislative compromises.145 
In fact, members prefer that agencies resolve contentious disputes, at least 
initially, through rulemaking or adjudication because it allows them to 
avoid frontline responsibility for governance.146 Leaving difficult policy 
decisions to agencies offers legislators a no-lose proposition. They can 
pass legislation without the burden of resolving difficult, contentions 
disputes, such as the trade-off between cleaner air and costlier widgets. 
Officeholders can then claim credit for improving the public’s health 
without emptying the voters’ wallets.147 If the responsible agency, which 
now must make the choice that Congress avoided, discovers a solution 
that reduces hazardous air pollution without stalling the economy let 
alone putting it into reverse, members can take credit for having entrusted 
“expert administrators” with decision-making authority. By contrast, if 
the agency fails to improve public health and sends the economy into a 
ditch, the members have someone to blame: “Washington bureaucrats.” 
For members of Congress, it is a win-win scenario. The upshot is that the 
most powerful of political forces—self-preservation—pushes legislators 
to delegate governing authority elsewhere and see how well the recipients 
exercise it. 
Private delegations also give Congress the opportunity to weaken the 
presidency.148 The Article II Executive Power and Appointments Clauses 
envision that the President will superintend the implementation of 
whatever responsibilities are required to make legislation work.149 To do 
so, the President needs to be able to appoint as “assistants or deputies”150 
 
 144. See DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 38–42 (1991); 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 122–23 (1962); Peter 
Bernholz, A General Social Dilemma: Profitable Exchange and Intransitive Group Preferences, 
in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE—II 361, 361–62 (James M. Buchanan & Robert Tollison eds., 
1984).  
 145. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (directing the Environmental Protection 
Agency to set primary air quality standards “requisite to protect the public health” with “an 
adequate margin of safety”). 
 146. See R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL’Y 371, 372 (1986) 
(discussing how politicians primarily are interested in avoiding blame). 
 147. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(noting that legislatures use delegation as an abdication of responsibility while still receiving 
credit for having ostensibly addressed a problem), reh’g denied, 140 S. Ct. 579 (2019); 
SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 10. 
 148. See Krent, supra note 46, at 73–74. 
 149. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 1, § 2, cl. 2. 
 150. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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people who share his policy views. Vesting implementing power in 
private parties bars the President from ensuring that the “management 
[of] these different matters” is in the hands of people whom he trusts.151 
If Congress is under the control of a different political party and itself 
selects the recipients of delegated power, Congress can lodge decision-
making authority in people entirely opposed to the President’s agenda 
and willing to engage in precisely the type of guerilla warfare against the 
administration that the President does not want if he is to be successful. 
Either way, the public suffers whenever political gamesmanship weakens 
the effectiveness of legislation or erodes public confidence in the non-
political aspects of government. 
B.  Why the Supreme Court Has Not Curtailed Congress’s Delegation 
of Lawmaking Power 
The inconsistency between the Constitution’s accountability-
guaranteeing architecture and legislators’ accountability-evading 
delegation practices is a stark one. The constitutional text specifies the 
terms of office in the national government and identifies, separates, and 
limits federal power in part to ensure that the electorate can periodically 
hold officials accountable for missteps or abuse of their powers.152 
According to the Supreme Court, those structural features are designed to 
protect each branch from the aggrandizing impulses of the other two, as 
well as the public from the potentially overwhelming power of an all-
powerful, three-in-one entity.153 Moreover, the Court has been willing to 
enforce the Constitution’s structural assignments of powers to the 
individual branches.154 It therefore is surprising that the Supreme Court 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 153. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly 
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 870 (1991) 
(“The leading Framers of our Constitution viewed the principle of separation of powers as the 
central guarantee of a just government. James Madison put it this way: ‘No political truth is 
certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of 
liberty.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961))); 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Separation of 
powers was designed to implement a fundamental insight: Concentration of power in the hands 
of a single branch is a threat to liberty.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (stating that 
our tripartite system of government is a “safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement 
of one branch at the expense of [another]”), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that the Framers separated power “the 
better to secure liberty”). 
 154. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018) (ruling that an SEC administrative 
law judge is an “Officer[] of the United States” who cannot be appointed by SEC staff (quoting 
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has been unwilling to rein in Congress’s apparently insatiable desire to 
delegate its Article I lawmaking responsibility elsewhere. Why is that? 
Why has the Supreme Court not intervened to ensure that Article I’s 
elected officials cannot escape their responsibility to make difficult 
decisions?  
This Article argues that there are three reinforcing explanations. The 
first explanation is that the Supreme Court has decided delegation cases 
against a landscape reflecting the enormous breadth of Congress’s 
contemporary legislative and oversight responsibilities, even though that 
background has evolved immeasurably beyond anything that the 
Founding Generation considered Congress’s properly limited role in 
American governance. As the Supreme Court put it in Mistretta v. United 
States,155 “[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical 
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”156 
Rather than decide whether today’s delegations are consistent with 
yesterday’s plan of government, the Supreme Court has used the 
 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2)); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (holding that the 
Article III Judicial Power Clause prohibits Congress from empowering federal bankruptcy courts 
to decide certain state law counterclaims); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 
U.S. 477, 514 (2010) (holding unconstitutional dual for-cause limitations on the President’s 
removal power); Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436–47 (holding unconstitutional the line item veto); Ryder 
v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184, 188 (1995) (rejecting the argument that application of the “de 
facto officer” doctrine can remedy a violation of the Article II Appointments Clause); Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (holding unconstitutional a statute vesting executive power in an 
official Congress appointed); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding unconstitutional 
a legislative veto); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 63–76 (1982) 
(plurality opinion) (holding that the Article III Judicial Power Clause prohibits Congress from 
empowering federal bankruptcy courts to decide certain state law claims), superseded by statute, 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 
as recognized in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015); Buckley, 424 U.S. 
at 143 (holding unconstitutional a statute empowering Congress to appoint Federal Election 
Commission officers); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (upholding the President’s 
authority to remove an executive official without the Senate’s advice and consent), overruled in 
part by Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (holding unconstitutional state terms limits for U.S. 
Representatives and Senators). There are exceptions. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 
356 (1958) (upholding a for-cause restriction on the President’s authority to remove a judge of a 
War Claims Commission); Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 626 (upholding a for-cause restriction 
on the President’s authority to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner); cf. Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) (upholding a facial challenge to a limitation on the U.S. Attorney 
General’s authority to remove the Independent Counsel). It is uncertain today which body of 
caselaw is the rule, and which is the exception. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Agency Deference After 
Kisor v. Wilkie, 18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 105, 141–42 (2020). 
 155. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 156. Id. at 372. 
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contemporary work of Congress as the baseline for measuring 
permissible delegations. That is critical because there has been no 
increase in the number of hours in the day to correspond with the 
workload that Congress has assumed since then. That approach makes 
broad delegations inevitable. Just as it would be futile or unworkable for 
the President himself to perform every administrative task necessary to 
run the government,157 it would be “impossible” or “impractical,” the 
Court has said, for Congress to devise every detail necessary for effective 
implementation of a statutory program.158 That practical understanding 
of Congress’s modern-day role in governance requires that Congress be 
allowed to pass laws that do almost no more than recite broad policy 
judgments and articulate vague implementing directions.  
An additional explanation is that, at least as the Court sees it, allowing 
a recipient merely “to fill up the details” of a general legislative scheme159 
does not threaten the interests of the other two branches or the liberty of 
the public—the two main concerns of separation of powers principles.160 
That is particularly true when the recipient of delegated authority merely 
adopts internal rules and practices it will follow to execute its duties, such 
as hours of operation, or forms and procedures that private parties must 
follow for that branch to conduct its business efficiently, including the 
 
 157. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483 (“In light of ‘[t]he impossibility that one 
man should be able to perform all the great business of the State,’ the Constitution provides for 
executive officers to ‘assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties of his trust.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 334 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 
1939))). 
 158. See, e.g., Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of the Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126, 145 
(1941) (“In an increasingly complex society Congress obviously could not perform its functions 
if it were obliged to find all the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined 
legislative policy in fixing, for example, a tariff rate, a railroad rate or the rate of wages to be 
applied in particular industries by a minimum wage law. The Constitution, viewed as a 
continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the 
impossible or the impracticable. The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of 
the legislative policy and its formulation as a rule of conduct. Those essentials are preserved when 
Congress specifies the basic conclusions of fact upon ascertainment of which, from relevant data 
by a designated administrative agency, it ordains that its statutory command is to be effective.”).  
 159. Which is how Chief Justice John Marshall described a provision in the First Judiciary 
Act that empowered the federal courts to adopt rules for the orderly conduct of judicial business. 
See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). 
 160. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 870 (1991) (“The leading Framers of our 
Constitution viewed the principle of separation of powers as the central guarantee of a just 
government. James Madison put it this way: ‘No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic 
value or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty.’” (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961))); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (expressing concern with “aggrandizement” by each branch), superseded by 
statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
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acceptable forms of pleading and writs.161 The fear of aggrandizement is 
also lessened when the Constitution itself vests specific power in the 
recipient of delegated authority. For example, because the President has 
the primary responsibility for the management of foreign policy,162 the 
Constitution allows Congress to assign him the responsibility to decide 
when a foreign nation is no longer engaged in hostile actions against this 
nation.163 By so reifying what it means to exercise the legislative power, 
the Court has narrowed the Framers’ concerns to an exceptionally small 
circle that one could label the Spike Lee Principle. Essentially, as long as 
Congress does a skosh more than merely tell an agency or private party 
to “Do the Right Thing,” the Supreme Court will uphold its delegation.164 
The third rationale for the Supreme Court’s reluctance to intervene is 
the difficulty of deciding when Congress has delegated too much 
legislative power—that is, when Congress has gone too far. The difficulty 
of making that decision is due to the inherent problem with constitutional 
interpretation whenever there are no objective textual criteria to define 
the provision at issue. For example, before enumerating the rights a 
person enjoys, the Sixth Amendment begins with the phrase “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.”165 That phrase 
alerts the reader (including judges) that all of the provisions that follow 
are limited to that type of government–citizen interaction. For that reason, 
the Supreme Court was readily able to conclude that the rights it provides 
do not apply until the government has formally charged someone with a 
crime, because only then is there a “criminal prosecution” and an 
“accused.”166 Numerous other provisions—the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause (or its fraternal twin, the Privileges or Immunities Clause), the 
Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Free Speech 
Clause, to name a few—however, are more Delphic than precise in their 
meaning and do not admit of an easy interpretation. The Supreme Court 
has concluded that federal judges are institutionally incapable of divining 
objective criteria to define the precise line separating permissible and 
 
 161. Wayman, 23 U.S. at 43, is an example of the latter proposition. See supra note 23. 
 162. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 14 (2015); United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (describing the President as “the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations”). 
 163. Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 389 (1813), is an 
example of that proposition. See supra note 23. 
 164. DO THE RIGHT THING (40 Acres and a Mule Filmworks & Universal Pictures 1989). 
 165. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 166. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971); see also, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 230–32, 238 (1983) (defining “probable cause” in the Fourth Amendment); Ex parte 
Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885) (construing the term “infamous crime” in the Fifth Amendment 
Indictment Clause to include an offense punishable by imprisonment). 
 
350717-FLR_73-1_Text.indd   77 2/22/21   10:31 AM
37
Larkin: The Private Delegation Doctrine
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
68 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
impermissible delegations.167 Drawing that line closely resembles the 
process courts undertake when deciding whether an act is the “actual” or 
“proximate” cause of an injury.168 There, a court must ask whether the 
harm was foreseeable and whether holding the responsible party liable is 
fair, which can bedevil even the most talented legal minds.169 As a result, 
answering those inquiries often deteriorates into the type of arbitrary line 
drawing exercise that the Supreme Court avoids like the plague.170  
Those three reasons likely explain why the Public Delegation 
Doctrine has survived in name only.171 The result is that the “intelligible 
principle” standard has become more an offer of advice than a rule of law. 
It has the same precautionary status for delegation purposes that a yellow-
background off-ramp highway sign has for the motor vehicle code: A 
legislator, like a driver, should be careful, but the police cannot ticket the 
driver if he exceeds the recommended speed while exiting. 
III.  PRIVATE DELEGATIONS AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
Scholars have defended the Private Delegation Doctrine on the ground 
that it protects parties against corrupt decision-making by preventing the 
government from delegating lawmaking or law-interpreting power to 
someone with an interest in the outcome of a rule or case. That is a 
reasonable but incomplete defense of the doctrine. The doctrine also has 
purchase whenever the government seeks to empower someone to act 
without regard to the law—in effect, to act in a “lawless” manner. English 
legal history reveals that the Crown could not act in that manner, and the 
United States Constitution carried that restriction forward via the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses.  
A.  The Problem with Delegating Power to a Biased Decision Maker 
Several scholars have concluded that the delegations in cases like 
Eubank, Roberge, and Carter involved not a Vesting Clause problem but 
rather the ancient problem of a biased decision maker.172 They are right 
 
 167. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001); Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 168. See, e.g., Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210–11 (2014); PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263–65 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).  
 169. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). 
 170. See, e.g., Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“The Free Speech 
Clause exists principally to protect discourse on public matters, but we have long recognized that 
it is difficult to distinguish politics from entertainment, and dangerous to try.”).  
 171. See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective 
Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1508 (2015). 
 172. See Froomkin, supra note 46, at 153; Lawrence, supra note 46, at 659–62, 694–95; 
Liebmann, supra note 46, at 664–67; James M. Rice, Note, The Private Nondelegation Doctrine: 
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to fault some private delegations on that ground. The principle of nemo 
iudex in causa sua—a Latin phrase that means “no one should be a judge 
in his own cause”—has deep roots in our law173 and underlies the due 
process rule that no one can adjudicate a case in which he has a financial 
interest.174 The neighbors in Eubank and Roberge, as well as the business 
rivals in Carter Coal, could use governmental power for their own 
financial or personal benefit. The risk that they would ignore their 
obligation to be impartial was as great as the risk that the judge in Tumey 
v. Ohio175—whose salary increased with a rise in the number of 
convictions—would tilt the balance in his favor.176 That is true even if a 
particular individual could put his personal interest aside and decide a 
case on its merits. Due process disqualifies a party from acting as the 
decision maker if “a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and 
human weakness” poses an unacceptable risk of bias.177 
The risk of a biased decision maker, however, is a case-specific 
problem that requires consideration of the potential disqualification of 
particular individuals. While that doctrine would require any court to set 
aside decisions made by potentially biased parties, it would not disturb 
judgments made by the College of Cardinals or other parties that have no 
financial, professional, or personal interest in the outcome. The Vesting 
Clause offers a broader challenge to private delegations because it could 
disqualify all private parties from exercising state power on the ground 
that separation of powers principles do not permit Congress to hand off 
its responsibilities to any non-governmental official. The Vesting Clause 
therefore remains relevant. 
As it turns out, the Due Process Clause might play a role of equal 
importance to that of the Vesting Clause. Most discussions of due process 
involve either the procedural or substantive doctrines that the Court has 
developed. The Supreme Court has developed two very different bodies 
of due process caselaw—one focusing on the likelihood that a specific 
 
Preventing the Delegation of Regulatory Authority to Private Parties and International 
Organizations, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 559–60 (2017); Volokh, supra note 46, at 942, 950. 
 173. See, e.g., Dr. Bonham’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B.); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, 
at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 
YALE L.J. 605, 611–12 (1947). 
 174. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876–77 (2009); Gibson v. 
Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
 175. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
 176. See id. at 519–20. 
 177. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (stating that, for a claim of unconstitutional 
risk of bias to succeed, the claim must show that “conferring investigative and adjudicative powers 
on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be 
forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented”). 
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adjudicatory procedure will provide accurate outcomes versus one that 
asks whether certain types of private conduct should be completely or 
presumptively immune from government regulation.178 This Article 
argues that the binary categorization of the Court’s due process caselaw 
falls one category short. There is another categorization—one that is 
“structural”—that plays as important a role as the two better known 
categories. That category gives effect to the last two words in the Due 
Process Clause: “of law.” Specifically, it guarantees that a state officer 
cannot deprive someone of life, liberty, or property unless his action is 
authorized by “law.” That guarantee is actually older and more 
fundamental than the ones discussed most often today because it protects 
against adverse governmental action justified only by whim, caprice, 
chance, or spite. And its origin is Magna Carta. 
B.  The Problem with Delegating Power to a Lawless Decision Maker 
Magna Carta is a historic and revered document of English legal 
history.179 Sometimes called the Torah of English law or the Bible of the 
English Constitution,180 Magna Carta has been treated as if it were a 
written constitution.181 Ironically, Magna Carta began not as a statement 
of principle like our Declaration of Independence, or as a charter of 
governance like our Constitution, but as a mere peace treaty designed to 
end a rebellion.182 King John’s arbitrary exercise of royal power, 
expensive and unsuccessful French military campaigns, incessant 
political intrigue, and frequent personal cruelties drove the English 
barons to renounce their feudal obligations to the Crown and combine to 
overthrow John.183 To quell the rebellion, in 1215 King John agreed in 
Runnymede meadow to the barons’ demands in the Great Charter.184 
 
 178. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 293, 294–
95 (2016). 
 179. For the background and significance of Magna Carta, see generally DAVID CARPENTER, 
MAGNA CARTA (2015) (reprinting the text and adding commentary and historical background for 
the Magna Carta); J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA (2d ed. 1992) (explaining the document’s text and 
history); A. E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1968) (connecting the Magna Carta to the development of 
constitutional Anglo-American jurisprudence); R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the ius 
commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (1999) (discussing the influences of Roman and canon laws on 
the charter). 
 180. DANNY DANZIGER & JOHN GILLINGHAM, 1215: THE YEAR OF MAGNA CARTA 277–78 
(2003); DANIEL HANNAN, INVENTING FREEDOM 110 (2013). 
 181. See 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 173 (2d ed. 1911).  
 182. See DANZIGER & GILLINGHAM, supra note 180, at 277. 
 183. WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT 
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 377 & n.1 (2d ed. 1914); HANNAN, supra note 180, at 108–09. 
 184. See HANNAN, supra note 180, at 109. 
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The most relevant (and well-known) provision in Magna Carta is 
Chapter 39, which is “a plain, popular statement of the most elementary 
rights” of Englishmen.185 In essence, the provision states that “no free 
man is to be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, exiled or damaged 
without lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.”186 
Chapter 39 prohibited the king from acting in a wanton, lawless 
manner—to speak colloquially, from taking the law into his own 
hands.187 It accomplished that result by guaranteeing that the Crown 
would be subject to the “rule of law.”188 And “the law of the land,” 
according to Sir Edward Coke, judge and dean of seventeenth century 
English law, was “the Common Law, Statute Law, or Custome of 
England.”189  
It is difficult to overstate the significance of Chapter 39 as a 
fundamental law and statement of principle. Yet, Chapter 39 was also 
merely a restatement of the then-contemporary English law.190 By 1215, 
English law was not whatever ukase the Crown would issue. Rather, the 
common law had come to be a corpus of rules applicable throughout 
England—a “law common to the whole land,”191 a “set of rights and 
obligations immanent in the country, growing incrementally” that were 
“passed down as part of the patrimony of each new generation.”192 
Moreover, the Crown was subject to the common law no less than any 
lord or vassal.193 As sixteenth century legal commentator Richard Hooker 
put it, the King owed his sovereign power to the law, which meant “the 
supreme authority in political society was not that of the ruler, but that of 
the law.”194 The “value” of Magna Carta was “more than a mere sum of 
the values of its . . . terms of any or all of its provisions”; that value 
 
 185. Charles E. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term “Liberty” in Those Clauses in the 
Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect “Life, Liberty, and Property,” 4 HARV. L. REV. 
365, 373 (1891). 
 186. HOLT, supra note 179, at 2. 
 187. C.H. McIlwain, Due Process of Law in Magna Carta, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 27, 41 (1914) 
(“The main point in this [provision], the chief grievance to be redressed, was the King’s practice 
of attacking his barons with forces of mercenaries, seizing their persons, their families and 
property, and otherwise ill-treating them, without first convicting them of some offence in his 
curia.”). 
 188. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE OF LAW 12 (2004); CONRAD RUSSELL, THE CAUSES OF THE 
ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 138 (1990).  
 189. Ellis Sandoz, Editor’s Introduction: Fortescue, Coke, and Anglo-American 
Constitutionalism, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE OF LAW 1, 25 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993).  
 190. See Larkin, supra note 178, at 332. 
 191. F. W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 13 (1955). 
 192. HANNAN, supra note 180, at 65. 
 193. REID, supra note 188, at 12. 
 194. A. J. CARLYLE, POLITICAL LIBERTY 53 (1941). 
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resided in the fact that the agreement “enunciated a definite body of law, 
claiming to be above the King’s will and admitted as such by John.”195 
Over time, the phrase “the law of the land” became “due process of law,” 
but that revision had no effect on its meaning, effect, or significance.196  
Chapter 39 of Magna Carta became a foundational part of American 
constitutional law in the eighteenth century.197 Familiar with Coke’s legal 
theories,198 the Founders saw Article 39 as exemplifying the tenet of 
English constitutionalism that a nation’s chief executive and legislature 
were obligated to respect the “natural and customary rights recognized at 
common law.”199 The Framers’ generation used the phrase “the law of 
the land” or “due process of law” in numerous important political 
documents, such as the Virginia Resolutions of 1769, the Declaration and 
Resolves of the First Continental Congress of 1774, the Declaration of 
Independence, later enacted state constitutions, and ultimately the Fifth 
Amendment.200 They did not see any material difference in meaning 
 
 195. MCKECHNIE, supra note 183, at 123. 
 196. Coke thought that the terms “due process of law” and “the law of the land” were 
interchangeable. See 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 50 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817); see also Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. 
McConnell, Essay, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012) 
(“Fundamentally, ‘due process’ meant that the government may not interfere with established 
rights without legal authorization and according to law, with ‘law’ meaning the common law as 
customarily applied by courts and retrospectively declared by Parliament, or as modified 
prospectively by general acts of Parliament.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 358 (2015) (“The colonists brought 
the principles of Magna Carta with them to the New World . . . .”); Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 91 
(2015) (plurality opinion) (“Edward Coke[’s] . . . Institutes ‘were read in the American Colonies 
by virtually every student of the law’ . . . .” (quoting Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225 
(1967))); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna 
Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 614 (2009) 
(“Because most of the American colonies were initially chartered and settled during the early 
seventeenth century, when Coke’s career as a judge and member of Parliament was at its height, 
Coke exerted a strong influence on colonial law. A large number of seventeenth-century American 
lawyers studied law in England, where Coke’s Reports and Institutes were a staple of legal 
education, just as they were in the American colonies until the publication of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries in 1765.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 198. See, e.g., Din, 576 U.S. at 91 (“Edward Coke[’s] . . . Institutes ‘were read in the Amer-
ican Colonies by virtually every student of the law’ . . . .” (quoting Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 225)). 
 199. Gedicks, supra note 197, at 619. 
 200. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2633 n.3 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Din, 576 U.S. at 91; Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
272, 276 (1855); HOWARD, supra note 179, at 211–15; 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1789 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1858); 
Gedicks, supra note 197, at 622–23; H. D. Hazeltine, The Influence of Magna Carta on American 
Constitutional Development, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (1917). 
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between the two phrases.201  
The upshot of that history is that the government cannot enact a statute 
that exempts itself from complying with the rule of law. Any such statute 
would be not a law but a license to act lawlessly. That principle has a 
particular urgency in the United States. According to Marbury v. 
Madison,202 no legislature can exempt itself from the Constitution.203 A 
legislature can always exempt itself from a generally applicable statute, 
but it cannot render itself immune from whatever restraints the 
Constitution imposes because it is the supreme law. And if that is true, 
then it follows that the government also cannot empower a private party 
to operate in lieu of the government but outside of the Constitution.  
 
 201. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of 
Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368 (1911). 
 202. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 203. As Chief Justice Marshall explained: 
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to 
different departments, their respective powers. It may either stop here; or 
establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.  
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers 
of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be 
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers 
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these 
limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The 
distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is 
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, 
and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition 
too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act 
repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary 
act.  
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is 
either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a 
level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the 
legislature shall please to alter it. 
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to 
the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are 
absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature 
illimitable.  
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them 
as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently 
the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, 
repugnant to the constitution, is void. 
Id. at 176–77. 
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The common denominator to Eubank, Roberge, and Carter Coal was 
that the law delegating the government’s authority to private parties not 
only had the effect of vesting the latter with lawmaking power, but also 
gave someone injured by the designees’ actions no recourse under the 
law. Each case made that point.204 Ironically, the effect was to create a 
mirror image of the process of declaring someone an “outlaw” at common 
law. That declaration placed the named party outside the protection of the 
law, allowing anyone who came across him to kill him with impunity.205 
The delegation in Eubank, Roberge, and Carter Coal had the opposite 
effect. Specifically, these cases lifted the legal restraints that would have 
been in effect if the government had taken the actions at issue, instead of 
the designated private parties. The result was an attempt to evade the 
restraints that the Constitution placed on arbitrary government action by 
turning over to private parties a decision that the government could not 
make free from legal restraints.  
The history of the birth and development of the Due Process Clause 
shows that such an attempt would be impermissible.206 After all, the 
barons at Runnymede would hardly have acquiesced in a decision by 
King John, after signing Magna Carta, to delegate royal power to a party 
of his choosing to avoid the Chapter 39 requirement of governance 
according to law. The barons certainly would have objected to the king’s 
attempt to nullify Chapter 39 by installing a puppet on the throne or by 
vesting an apparatchik with the Crown’s authority, someone who would 
unhesitatingly carry out John’s orders regardless of their compliance with 
the common law. They, and the Framers, who understood the value of 
Magna Carta, would doubtless have deemed any such decree as a sham. 
Remember that the barons were aware of King John’s stratagems and 
abuses of power. Chapter 39 sought to eliminate them, not simply to 
transfer them to someone else chosen by the king, who could then be as 
equally capricious because he would be free from the limitations of that 
chapter. 
 
 204. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title 
Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143–
44 (1912); see supra notes 58, 68, 75 and accompanying text. 
 205. Nathan Levy, Jr., Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power 
Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52, 80 (1968) (“Upon the dread proclamation of outlawry, such dire 
consequences resulted as corruption of blood, escheat of lands, forfeiture of chattels, and, as if 
that were not enough, a one-way trip to the gallows without further trial. The outlaw was so far 
beyond the protection of the law that he could—at least prior to the thirteenth century—be slain 
on sight and with impunity by any person.”); Bobby G. Deaver, Note, Outlawry: Another “Gothic 
Column” in North Carolina, 41 N.C. L. REV. 634, 635 (1963); see, e.g., Dale Cnty. v. Gunter, 46 
Ala. 118, 138–39 (1871); Respublica v. Doan, 1 Dall. 86, 90 (Pa. 1784). 
 206. See Leonard G. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 
1048, 1049–50 (1968). 
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The same principle should apply today when the federal government 
seeks to transfer governmental power to private parties. The Framers 
sought to limit the powers of the new central government. Articles I, II, 
and III accomplish that goal in several ways: They create a limited 
number of federal elected or appointed offices; restrict how private 
parties may come to hold and exercise the powers of those offices; and 
provide express and implied remedies for cases in which officeholders 
abuse their delegated authority.207 The Due Process Clause protects the 
public against the federal government’s attempt to shed those rules by 
delegating power to private parties, whether individuals or corporations. 
Reading the Due Process Clause as a requirement that government 
officers exercise their lawmaking authority only pursuant to “the law of 
the land” accomplishes that result by forbidding the government from 
authorizing private parties, who are unencumbered by any constitutional 
restrictions on their exercise of government power,208 to fill in as 
erstwhile federal officials. Permitting federal officials to delegate power 
in that manner leaves the recipient able to act without being subject to the 
safeguards that protect the public against government abuse. It makes 
 
 207. Article I establishes a Congress of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall 
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). The election and term limit provisions 
imposed by Articles I and II, along with the Twelfth, Seventeenth, and Twenty-second 
Amendments, create procedures for the periodic election to the offices of Representatives, 
Senators, and Presidents. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (specifying that House members shall 
hold office for two years); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (specifying that Senators shall hold office for six 
years); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (specifying that the President holds office for four years); id. amend. 
XII (specifying how the President will be elected); id. amend. XVII (requiring popular election of 
Senators every six years); id. amend. XXII, § 1 (limiting the number of years that a person may 
hold office as President). Under the Elections Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, Congress may 
preempt state laws governing the time, place, and manner of holding federal elections, but not the 
qualifications for voting in them. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 
16–17 (2013); THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 135, at 326. The Bicameralism and Presentment requirements 
of Article I, Section 7, regulate how those officeholders may make “Law.” See U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 7, cls. 2, 3; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948–49 (1983) (explaining that through the 
bicameral requirement, the Framers reemphasized their belief in the Presentment Clauses that 
legislation should not be enacted unless it has been fully considered by the Nation’s elected 
officials); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (stating that “All Bills for raising Revenue shall 
originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with 
Amendments as on other Bills”); cf. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448–49 (1998) 
(noting that Article I requires the same process in order to repeal or amend an existing law). The 
legislative powers granted to Congress in the next section, Article I, Section 8, identify the 
particular subjects that those laws may govern. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing the “[p]ower[s]” 
that Congress may use law to regulate).  
 208. Only the Thirteenth Amendment applies to private conduct. The other provisions are 
limits on government power. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620–27 (2000); 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 23 (1883). 
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little sense to read the Constitution as permitting its restrictions to be so 
easily evaded.  
Consider three safeguards in effect for every public delegation. Two 
are the Article II Appointments209 and Executive Power210 Clauses. 
Together, they enable the President to appoint assistants to execute the 
laws and to direct how federal officials exercise their assigned powers. 
The President can overrule their decisions and, if necessary, remove any 
federal employee who goes off on a frolic and detour of his own 
creation.211 That is not the case when Congress delegates authority to a 
private party. Private delegations keep the President from managing the 
work of the Executive Branch, which Congress can use to evade 
constitutional restrictions on executive officials, to reduce the authority 
of the President, or both. The third safeguard is the Impeachment and 
 
 209. The Article II Appointments Clause provides, “The President . . . shall nominate, and 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Appointments Clause regulates what personnel may 
exercise federal authority. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 492–511 (2010); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (“The Appointments Clause 
prevents Congress from dispensing power too freely; it limits the universe of eligible recipients 
of the power to appoint.”); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721–22, 730 (1986). The 
Appointments Clause protects the appointing authority against interference from any other person 
or branch of the federal government. See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2199 (2020). 
It guarantees that only properly appointed parties who are therefore (presumably) properly vetted 
can exercise federal power. See id. at 2197–98. Finally, it ensures that any official exercising 
federal power can be removed at a minimum for misconduct or incompetence, even if not for 
other reasons. See, e.g., id.; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 501–02; Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 483 n.4, 484 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The term “Officers of the 
United States” includes any person who occupies a “continuing” position established by law and 
exercises the “significant authority” of the federal government. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 
2051 (2018) (first quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879); then quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81). Article II demands that anyone 
to whom those criteria apply be appointed by the President, with the “Advice and Consent of the 
Senate,” or by another party identified in the clause, such as “Heads of Departments.” U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see, e.g., Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053–55 (ruling that SEC administrative law judges 
are officers); Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 658, 666 (1997) (ruling that civilian 
members of the U.S. Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals are officers); Weiss v. United States, 
510 U.S. 163, 169–70 (1994) (ruling that military judges are officers); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881 
(ruling that “special trial judges” of the U.S. Tax Court are officers); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 
(ruling that Federal Election Commissioners are officers). 
 210. Article II creates the office of the President of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 1. The Article II Take Care Clause directs the President to ensure that the “Laws” are 
faithfully executed. Id. art. II, § 3.  
 211. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493. 
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Removal Clauses.212 They allow Congress to remove executive officials 
who abuse their powers if the President will not do so. They are limited, 
however, to only the “President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of 
the United States,”213 which would prevent Congress from removing a 
private party from whatever position it fills. 
That is why the problem with the privatization of government 
functions is not merely the risk of biased decision-making. Instead, the 
problem is the government’s effort to shed its accountability for officers 
exercising a public function. That problem would exist if the government 
delegated decision-making power to a body of retired federal judges or 
someone else of unimpeachable integrity because it would deprive 
anyone injured by the exercise of delegated authority the opportunity to 
seek judicial relief to hold the government in check. The problem would 
also exist even if Congress delegates a so-called non-core or ancillary 
governmental function to a private party. For example, the Constitution 
does not require that the government provide welfare benefits, housing, 
or medical services of any type; they are optional.214 Yet, the principle at 
stake is still the same. Granting private parties public authority over a 
matter otherwise deemed fit only for governmental responsibility 
“eliminates the protections that the rule of law offers everyone as part of 
the political and social compact that the Framers offered to the nation in 
1787.”215 
Delegating governmental authority to private parties flies in the face 
of a system that delegates governing authority from private parties to 
government officials but only insofar as they operate within the 
constraints that the Constitution and other laws impose. As I have 
previously explained: 
Granting a private party power that the Constitution vests 
only in parties who hold the offices created or contemplated 
by Articles I, II, and III is the exact opposite of what the 
Framers had in mind. If followed across the board, that 
practice would allow federal officials to turn the operation 
of government over to private parties and go home. That 
result would not be to return federal power to the states. At 
a macro level, it would be to abandon responsibilities that 
the Constitution envisioned only a centralized government 
could execute to ensure that the new nation could survive 
 
 212. And those provisions establish a mechanism—impeachment—to remove an 
officeholder who abuses the powers of his office. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, § 3, cls. 6, 7. 
 213. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 214. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (ruling that the Constitution 
does not require the government to provide health care services). 
 215. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law and the 
Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 418 (2015). 
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and prosper. At a micro level, it would be to leave to the 
King’s delegate the same arbitrary power that Magna Carta 
sought to prohibit the King from exercising through the rule 
of law. The “plan of the Convention” was to create a new 
central government with the responsibility to manage the 
affairs of the nation for the benefit of the entire public with 
regard to particular functions—protecting the nation from 
invasion, ensuring free commercial intercourse among the 
states and with foreign governments, and so forth—that only 
a national government could adequately handle. The states 
were responsible for everything else, and they had 
incorporated the common law into their own legal principles. 
The result was to protect the public against the government 
directly taking their lives, liberties, and property through the 
use of government officials or indirectly accomplishing the 
same end by letting private parties handle that job. The rule 
of law would safeguard the public against the government’s 
choice of either option. Using private parties to escape the 
carefully crafted limitations that due process imposes on 
government officials is just a cynical way to defy the 
Framers’ signal accomplishment of establishing a 
government under law.216  
The concept of “a government under law” is critical in this regard. The 
Constitution is the nation’s fundamental law, and the government cannot 
exempt itself from compliance with it, as Marbury v. Madison made 
clear.217 Congress cannot allow individuals who do not satisfy the age, 
citizenship, and birth requirements of Articles I and II to become Senators, 
Representatives, or President because those provisions define the 
requirements to hold office.218 Congress cannot turn the impeachment 
process over to private judges, lawyers, professors, or ministers because 
the Framers did not subject removal decisions to plebiscite.219 Congress 
cannot designate someone other than the President to sign or veto 
legislation because, as the nation’s chief executive, he must decide what 
may become a federal law.220 Congress cannot enact a bill of attainder or 
ex post facto criminal statutes,221 nor can it divest a defendant in a criminal 
case of the right to trial by a jury of his peers,222 because Congress cannot 
vote away limitations on its own power. Congress cannot redefine the 
 
 216. Id. at 419–20. 
 217. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–78 (1803).  
 218. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
 219. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, § 3, cl. 6. 
 220. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3. 
 221. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 222. See id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI. 
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crime of treason to include criticism of a sitting President or one of its 
members, regardless of the strength of its desire to do so.223 If Congress 
cannot take any of those steps, what sense does it make to say that Congress 
can turn over its legislative responsibilities to private parties who are 
unencumbered by those—or any other—constitutional regulations? Even 
if scrutiny is limited to only the criminal justice system, the problem 
persists. If Congress cannot assign the trial of federal criminal cases to a 
judge chosen from the community without the tenure and salary 
protections Article III requires,224 how can Congress turn over the 
operation of the federal criminal law to the entire community?225 
A response might invoke the theory of the dog that did not bark.226 Why 
has the Supreme Court not reconsidered private delegations under the 
rubric suggested here? The likely explanation is two-fold. It is only 
relatively recently that the Court has shown a rekindled interest in 
scrutinizing how Congress structures decision-making responsibility. The 
Court concluded in 1926 in Myers v. United States227 that, as part of his 
authority to manage the operation of the Executive Branch, the President 
 
 223. See id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. 
 224. See id. art. III, § 1; McElroy v. U.S. ex rel.  Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 287 (1960) (ruling 
that the federal government can prosecute civilians only in an Article III court and cannot require 
them to stand trial in a military court-martial even for offenses they are alleged to have committed 
while in military service); U.S. ex rel. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246–47 (1960) (same); 
U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955) (same); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 
(1 Wheat.) 304, 337 (1816) (“No part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can, 
consistently with the constitution, be delegated to state tribunals.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of 
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 952 (1988) 
(noting that “the historical core of the public rights doctrine” does not include “the actual or 
threatened exercise by government of coercive powers” under “the criminal law”); id. at 952 n.208 
(“[C]riminal cases traditionally have been regarded as requiring judicial resolution . . . .”) (citation 
omitted). 
 225. That is not to say that the government acts improperly when officials exercise state 
power in response to constituent demands. Articles I and II establish a governing process that by 
design renders the members of those branches politically accountable to the electorate. However 
much we may wish that government officials will act with only the disinterested interests of the 
nation, state, or county in mind, we must concede that political and personal self-interest will 
govern their actions at least some of the time. See, e.g., Editorial, The Dirt and Delay Playbook, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2018, 7:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dirt-and-delay-
playbook-1536966589 [https://perma.cc/S9W7-CQ8V]. In fact, the First Amendment Petition 
Clause guarantees each person a right to ask the government to redress a perceived “grievance” 
even if the only alleged wrong or injustice is that someone else has what he wants. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people . . . to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”). It would be odd to say that the Constitution forbids 
what it elsewhere approves. 
 226. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (citing ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, 
Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335 (1927)). 
 227. 272 U.S. 52 (1926), overruled in part by Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 
602 (1935). 
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can remove executive officials without the approval of Congress.228 
Later, however, the Court twice upheld restraints on the President’s 
removal power, ruling in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States229 and 
Wiener v. United States230 that Congress may impose “for-cause” 
restriction on the President’s removal authority,231 and as recently as 
1988 the Court signaled in Morrison v. Olson232 that those decisions were 
still good law.233 By contrast, even more recent decisions, such as 
Bowsher v. Synar234 and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting 
Oversight Board,235 suggest that the Court might be willing to reconsider 
Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener in light of Appointments Clause 
jurisprudence that came on scene decades after Carter Coal with the 
Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo.236 Finally, since 1976, every private 
delegation case but one has involved a state delegation, and neither the 
Appointments Clause nor the federal separation of powers doctrine 
applies to the states.237 The only exception is Amtrak II,238 where a 
majority of the Court concluded that Amtrak was an arm of the federal 
government for purposes of the Private Delegation Doctrine.239 Justices 
Thomas and Alito, however, said that the Court should reconsider its 
delegation precedents in an appropriate case.240 Accordingly, Eubank, 
Roberge, and Carter Coal should not be counted out yet. 
There is also reason for optimism that the Private Delegation Doctrine 
will survive. The principal explanation for the Supreme Court’s hesitancy 
to enforce the Public Delegation Doctrine is its reluctance to draw 
 
 228. Id. at 135. 
 229. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).  
 230. 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
 231. Id. at 356; Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629. 
 232. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 233. See id. at 687–88, 693 (upholding a facial challenge to a limitation on the U.S. Attorney 
General’s authority to remove the Independent Counsel). 
 234. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 235. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).  
 236. 424 U.S. 1 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81; see Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 
496–98. Another possibility is that the Court would limit Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener to 
their facts. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2198–99 (2020) 
(cabining those decisions to “multimember bodies with ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘quasi-legislative’ 
functions”). 
 237. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (“How power 
shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a 
question for the state itself. Nothing in the distribution here attempted supplies the basis for an 
exception.”). 
 238. 575 U.S. 43 (2015). 
 239. Id. at 55.  
 240. Id. at 62, 66 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 77 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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arbitrary lines between lawful and unlawful delegations. A similar 
problem exists in private delegations because the distinction between 
public and private organizations has grown indistinct.241 If that were the 
only way to define the Private Delegation Doctrine, if there were no 
alternative way to apply the doctrine to contemporary delegation 
practices, the Court might be no more willing to revitalize Eubank, 
Roberge, and Carter Coal than to resuscitate Panama Refining and 
Schechter Poultry. But there is another way to set boundaries. The theory 
this Article proposes—one that focuses on the external restraints the rule 
of law imposes on the recipient of delegated power, rather than on the 
reach of the delegation itself—holds promise as a means of restraining 
unreasonable private delegations.  
Consider the Court’s recent treatment of the issue whether an injured 
party should be able to bring a Bivens action242 against private prisons 
and correctional personnel.243 The Supreme Court has declined to create 
a constitutional damages remedy where state tort law provides a 
reasonable alternative.244 State tort remedies need not be identical to the 
relief that would be open to a prisoner confined in a federally or state-run 
facility,245 but those remedies must be “capable of protecting the 
 
 241. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 45, at 22 (“It is not unusual for the boundaries between 
public and private to blur. The lines themselves are historical inventions.”); John J. DiIulio, Jr., 
Response, Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1271, 1283 (2003) 
(“Drawing the line between policy execution and policymaking is difficult, and public 
administration, both as a field of practice and as an academic discipline, has been struggling for 
over a century with the problem.”); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the 
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1982). 
 242. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971), the Court implied a damages cause of action directly under the Fourth Amendment 
for the unlawful search of an innocent party’s home. See id. at 397. There was no other remedy 
available to someone not charged with a crime, meaning that, as Justice John Harlan so colorfully 
put it in his separate opinion, “For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.” Id. at 410 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
 243. See Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 131 (2012) (ruling that a prisoner cannot bring a 
constitutional damages action against individual private prison employees); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (holding that a prisoner cannot bring a constitutional damages 
action where a private corporation is the defendant). 
 244. Minneci, 565 U.S. at 125–26; cf. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 541, 550–51 (2007) 
(declining to create a constitutional tort action against federal officials for alleged Due Process 
Clause violations when tort law provided an adequate alternative remedy). In fact, the Court has 
said that it will not extend its past Bivens cases beyond the four corners of their holdings. See 
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1859–60 (2017) (“If the case is different in a meaningful way 
from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context is new. . . . [W]hether a 
damages action should be allowed is a decision for the Congress to make, not the courts.”). 
 245. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 § 6, 28 
U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (requiring that the United States be substituted in as the defendant in a tort 
action against a federal employee for actions within the scope of his employment); Osborn v. 
 
350717-FLR_73-1_Text.indd   91 2/22/21   10:31 AM
51
Larkin: The Private Delegation Doctrine
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
82 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 
 
constitutional interests at stake.”246 For example, the remedy would be 
sufficient if the allegedly tortious conduct “is of a kind that typically falls 
within the scope of traditional state tort law” (such as physical injury), if 
state tort law imposes a duty of “reasonable care (including medical 
care)” on a private prison facility or its personnel, and if state law 
recognizes a cause of action (for assault or negligence).247 That is 
sufficient even if a plaintiff cannot recover compensation for every 
claimed injury.248 As the Supreme Court explained in Minneci v. 
Pollard,249 “the question is whether, in general, state tort law remedies 
provide roughly similar incentives for potential defendants to comply 
with the Eighth Amendment while also providing roughly similar 
compensation to victims of violations.”250  
One of the criticisms of private delegation is that the courts cannot 
adequately police private conduct because the Supreme Court has refused 
to apply constitutional restraints to such conduct under the State Action 
Doctrine.251 Courts “assiduously adhere to a formal but increasingly 
unrealistic public-private distinction,” the criticism goes, “that protects 
contractors from significant legal and constitutional accountability.”252 
The theory this Article proposes avoids that criticism by requiring that 
courts be open to provide reasonable common law tort and contract 
remedies for abusive conduct by recipients of government power. The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Minneci allowed ex post common law 
remedies to substitute for ex ante constitutional restraints. That is a 
reasonable judgment given that after-the-fact damage remedies can have 
the same type of regulatory effect as antecedent agency rules.253 Relying 
 
Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 238–41 (2007) (concluding that the Westfall Act immunizes federal 
employees from a tort suit through their removal and the substitution of the United States as 
defendant). 
 246. Minneci, 565 U.S. at 125, 129 (“State-law remedies and a potential Bivens remedy need 
not be perfectly congruent.”); see Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. 
 247. Minneci, 565 U.S. at 127–29, 131. 
 248. Id. at 129 (rejecting the argument that a cap on the amount of damages, the denial of 
damages for emotional suffering unconnected with physical harm, and the use of an expert panel 
in a medical malpractice case render a state remedy inadequate). 
 249. 565 U.S. 118 (2012). 
 250. Id. at 130. 
 251. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 46, at 1444–45. 
 252. Freeman & Minow, supra note 13, at 16. 
 253. As Supreme Court Justice and Professor Stephen Breyer has explained: “The common 
law is in fact a regulatory system . . . . It depends on the creation and enforcement, by law, of a 
set of rights, notably those creating private property and enforceable contracts.” STEPHEN G. 
BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 4 (7th ed. 2011); see also, e.g., 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 7 (2005) (“[A]ntitrust is a form of 
regulation—a type of market intervention in an economy whose nucleus is private markets.”); 
HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 12–35 (1955) (discussing the development 
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on common law remedies for superintendence of private parties 
exercising government authority also makes sense from a management 
perspective because it answers the questions necessary for accountability 
to survive: What mechanism exists to provide relief for injuries? What 
relief is available? Who can obtain relief? On what grounds? What 
standards apply? Who can be held responsible? What are the effects of 
the operation of that system?254 
Evaluating the nature of the remedies available under state law to an 
injured party is far more amenable to reasoned judicial inquiry than is 
deciding whether a particular delegation has gone too far. Minneci not 
only pursued that precise inquiry, but also expressly rested its holding on 
the reasonableness of making that determination. Minneci also made clear 
the Court’s readiness to undertake that inquiry to ensure that private 
correctional facilities and their personnel cannot simply take the law into 
their own hands. Examining whether state law remedies are protected is 
also similar to the type of inquiry that the Court has performed in 
determining whether Congress has violated Article III by removing 
particular issues from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.255 The result 
is that federal courts should be able to avoid getting lost in the line 
drawing Serbonian Bog that the Public Delegation Doctrine has become. 
IV.  APPLICATION OF THE PRIVATE DELEGATION DOCTRINE 
At this point, the reader is entitled to ask for an example or two to 
illustrate how the theory set forth above would apply in practice. The 
following sections discuss two such applications. One deals with the 
problems that arise when a legislature empowers non-government 
officials to make law on a continuous or irregular basis by passing a 
statute that automatically incorporates by reference as governing law 
whatever rules or standards a private organization might adopt. The other 
application can be seen when the legislative and executive branches 
collaborate to delegate to a private party the responsibility to perform a 
function that traditionally had been viewed as a “core” function that only 
the government may legitimately perform. More specifically, an example 
 
of antitrust law in the United States, showing that the common law provided remedies to address 
unfair competition claims before passage of the Antitrust Laws, such as the Sherman Act). 
 254. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the 
Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 115, 118 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). 
 255. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 
1372–74 (2018); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482–95 (2011); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67–76 (1982) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 
as recognized in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015); id. at 91 (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932) (discussing the so-called “public-
rights” doctrine). 
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of the former is the passage of a law that dynamically incorporates private 
rules or standards; an example of the latter is the use of privately owned 
and operated prisons to confine and supervise parties convicted of a 
crime. 
A.  The Dynamic Incorporation of Private Rules or Standards 
The Constitution defines how a “Bill” can become a “Law,”256 but it is 
silent on how an idea can become a “Bill,” which gives Congress complete 
freedom to draw on whatever sources it chooses. Taking advantage of that 
flexibility, some acts incorporate by reference existing laws, a technique 
known as static incorporation.257 Static incorporation poses no delegation 
problem. It both meets the Article I Bicameralism and Presentment 
requirements and ensures legislative accountability because it simply 
adopts previously existing laws to create the new law.  
By contrast, there are occasions where an act of Congress incorporates 
future rules someone else may create, a technique known as dynamic 
incorporation.258 That term, however, is misleading. What dynamic 
incorporation in fact does is delegate lawmaking power to someone else on 
an ongoing basis.259 The recipient of lawmaking authority can formulate, 
re-evaluate, and revise the law over time. Where that party is a government 
agency, dynamic incorporation is an example of empowering a regulatory 
body to make law. In fact, the Chevron doctrine directs courts to accept an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute,260 even if the 
agency has changed its position.261 
Dynamic incorporation becomes problematic, however, when 
Congress uses that legislative technique to delegate lawmaking power to a 
private party. Dynamic incorporation thereby vests governmental power 
in private parties that may not be politically responsible, directly or 
indirectly, to the federal electorate.262 It is the legislative equivalent of 
 
 256. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3 (including further details in the Bicameralism and 
Presentment Clauses). Each chamber can supplement the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses 
through its own internal operating rules. See id. § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules 
of its Proceedings . . . .”). 
 257. Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104–
05 (2008); Larkin, supra note 215, at 359. 
 258. Dorf, supra note 257, at 104–05. 
 259. Id. at 105. 
 260. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 261. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 
(2005). 
 262. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each 
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature.”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
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enabling private parties to add new “pocket parts” to the law whenever and 
however they see fit. It is as if Congress handed over to someone outside 
of Articles I or II a piece of paper with all the trappings of a bill but none 
of its content and without any of the restraints that protect the public against 
the arbitrary exercise of government power. 
What is worse is that occasionally Congress delegates lawmaking 
power to a foreign government or international body. For example, the 
Lacey Act263 makes it a federal crime to import flora or fauna into this 
nation in violation of the laws of the country from whence that item 
came.264 The government convicted David McNab of importing a 
significant number of undersized lobsters packed in plastic rather than 
paper, some of which contained eggs, all in violation of Honduran law; 
the district court sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment.265 That is a 
mighty stiff punishment for a federal court to impose for conduct that no 
act of Congress outlawed. 
Yet, the Lacey Act is not the only such example of delegating decision-
making authority to a foreign body. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer 
has noted that “with increasing frequency” our government has joined a 
large number of agreements that empower foreign governments to adopt 
rules governing the conduct of Americans.266 Handing a foreign 
 
thereof may direct, a Number of [presidential] Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators 
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be 
appointed an Elector.”); id. amend. XVII (“The electors [for Senators] in each State shall have the 
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.”). Under 
the Elections Clause, id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, Congress may preempt state laws governing the time, 
place, and manner of holding federal elections, but not the qualifications for voting in them. See 
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2013); THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, 
supra note 207, at 371; THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 135, at 323.  
 263. Ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 701). 
 264. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a); Larkin, supra note 215, at 348–54. 
 265. See United States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003). For a full 
explanation of the case, see Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of 
Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 777–82 (2012). 
 266. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD 227 (2015); id. at 197 (“[T]here were 
123 international governmental organizations (IGOs) in 1951, about double that figure (242) in 
1971, and about fifteen times as many in 2012, which saw 1,993 IGOs.”); see also, e.g., Nat. Res. 
Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 9–10 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the Clean Air Act and 
Montreal Protocol created an ongoing international political commitment rather than a delegation 
of lawmaking authority to annual meetings of the parties); Curtis A. Bradley, International 
Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1585, 
1591, 1595 (2003) (discussing the increasing amount of international adjudicatory bodies and the 
implications their rulings have on U.S. conduct and litigation); David Golove, The New 
Confederalism: Treaty Delegations of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Authority, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1697, 1734–35 (2003) (discussing the relationship between domestic law and delegations to 
international bodies); John Harrison, International Adjudicators and Judicial Independence, 30 
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government “fill-in-the-blank authority for one of our domestic laws” not 
only creates a categorical exception to the Article I Bicameralism and 
Presentment rules, but also nullifies the right to self-government that the 
Founding Generation had just successfully won by the Revolution.267 
Moreover, unlike federal and state officials who are “bound by Oath or 
Affirmation” to support the Constitution,268 foreign officials and private 
parties owe this nation no duty of allegiance, and might even be obliged 
to remain loyal to a nation whose interests conflict with America’s own. 
Accordingly, there could be no greater Legislative Vesting Clause 
violation than giving a foreign government or international organization 
the authority to make laws that govern Americans. Granting foreign 
governments or parties lawmaking power is less a delegation of authority 
than it is a surrender of sovereignty.269 
  
 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 127, 127 (2006) (discussing the power of treaty-empowered 
international bodies to bind the United States as a matter of international law); Julian G. Ku, The 
Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old 
Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 71–72 (2000) (examining constitutional objections to the United 
States’ participation in international organizations); Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of 
International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 1586 (2004) (discussing legislative 
implications of the United States’ participation in international institutions); Rice, supra note 172, 
at 542 (discussing the delegation of regulatory power to international organizations). I have 
previously argued that Congress cannot delegate lawmaking power to a foreign party. Larkin, 
supra note 215, at 340. 
 267. Larkin, supra note 215, at 377–78, 380 (“Foreign nations do not elect Senators and 
Congressmen to Congress, nor do they choose electors for President. Instead, they send 
‘Ambassadors and other public Ministers’ to America. Foreign nations do not pass laws for 
governance of this nation. Instead, with the cooperation of the President, they make treaties. 
Foreign nations, unlike states, do not require their officials to swear allegiance to our 
Constitution—and, even if they did, the oath would have no importance for purposes of federal 
law. Accordingly, as far as our Constitution is concerned, foreign officials stand in the same 
position as private parties. In fact, because they (presumably) swear allegiance to their own 
constitutions, foreign officials actually occupy a worse position.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art II, § 3)). 
 268. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 269. Dorf, supra note 257, at 115 (“Dynamic incorporation of foreign law poses a prima 
facie threat to the democracy of the incorporating polity because it takes decisions out of the hands 
of the people’s representatives in that polity and delegates them to persons and bodies that are 
accountable only to a different polity, if at all. Under various circumstances, such a delegation of 
power may be sensible as a matter of policy. It may even increase the democratic accountability 
of the political system as a whole. Nonetheless, where the polity that dynamically incorporates 
foreign law is a reasonably well-constituted democracy, the act authorizing dynamic incorporation 
undermines self-government within that polity so conceived.”). Dorf cites the United States as 
one such democracy. Id. 
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B.  Private Jails and Prisons 
Privatization has also reached into one of the most ancient of public 
institutions—the criminal justice system.270 Although some 
commentators have argued that imprisonment is (or ought to be) a 
nondelegable core government function,271 there is a long history of using 
private detention facilities to confine adult offenders in England and the 
United States.272 That practice gradually fell into disuse a century ago, 
 
 270. See, e.g., Mick Ryan & Tony Ward, Privatization and Penal Politics, in PRIVATIZING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 52, 53 (Roger Matthews ed., 1989); DAVID SHICHOR & MICHAEL J. GILBERT, 
PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 (2001); Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel, The Case Against 
Privatization, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 67, 92 (2013); Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict 
Criminal Sanctions: The Case Against Privately Inflicted Sanctions, 14 LEGAL THEORY 113, 114 
(2008); Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in 
the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1860 (1999); Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 911 (2007). 
 271. See John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A Critical Perspective on the Private 
Management of Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 155, 172–73 
(Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990); Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on 
Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REV. 911, 952 (1988). That argument draws strength from 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who argued that the raison d’être for public government is its 
enhanced ability to protect against private marauders. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 169 
(Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, supra note 18, at 324. 
 272. See, e.g., JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES 
ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 9–13 (2001); DiIulio, supra note 271, at 158 (“For much of the nineteenth 
century and as late as the 1960s, prisons and jails in many parts of the United States were privately 
owned and operated.”); Malcolm M. Feeley, Lecture, The Unconvincing Case Against Private 
Prisons, 89 IND. L.J. 1401, 1412–14 (2014). Consider the federal system: Initially, there were no 
federal prisons or jails. Federal courts would sentence convicted defendants to confinement in any 
state facility in the state of conviction that was willing to accept them. Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 
65, § 15, 4 Stat. 115, 118; Act of Mar. 3, 1835, ch. 40, § 5, 4 Stat. 775, 777; Act of Mar. 28, 1856, 
ch. 9, 11 Stat. 2; Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 3, 13 Stat. 500, 500. Some states complied with 
this request. See McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 9, 16 (1844) (discussing a Mississippi 
statute); Randolph v. Donaldson, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 76, 84 (1815) (discussing a Virginia statute); 
Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF 
THE PRISON 151, 166–67 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1998). In other states, the First 
Congress and later Congresses permitted the federal marshal, under the direction of the federal 
district judge, to “hire a convenient place to serve as a temporary jail” until permanent 
arrangements could be made. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 225; Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, 
§ 6, 4 Stat. 632, 634; see Randolph, 13 U.S. at 85. During the Civil War, Congress also empowered 
the Secretary of the Interior to assign federal prisoners to state prisons. Act of May 12, 1864, ch. 
85, § 1, 13 Stat. 74, 74–75 (adult prisoners); Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 121, § 1, 13 Stat. 538, 538 
(juvenile offenders). A few years later, Congress gave the Attorney General broad authority to 
assign federal prisoners to any suitable jail or prison. Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 183, 19 Stat. 88; 
Act of Mar. 5, 1872, ch. 30, 17 Stat. 35. The first federal prison opened in Leavenworth, Kansas, 
in 1903. See Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 483–84 (1981); Cosgrove v. Smith, 697 F.2d 1125, 
1135–36 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Today, the federal 
government often contracts with private parties that provide halfway houses (also known as group 
homes or community treatment centers) for adult offenders re-entering society, for juveniles 
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but in the last four decades the federal and state governments have 
frequently resorted to privately owned and operated jails, prisons, and 
detention facilities to relieve overcrowding and take advantage of alleged 
private market efficiencies.273 Here, as with other issues of privatization, 
the argument in favor of such facilities is principally economic: private 
companies can build prisons more quickly and operate them more 
efficiently than the government can.274 Critics say that private firms are 
more efficient only because they skimp on the amount or quality of the 
food, medical care, rehabilitative services, or legal protection that 
prisoners must receive in a public facility, and that they lack the expertise 
that public correctional officers have acquired over time.275 As the 
practice grew more common, the government’s reliance on private 
prisons became a controversial one, both as a policy and a constitutional 
matter.276 Nonetheless, private prisons weathered that criticism, and the 
 
subject to restraint, and for aliens subject to detention pending admission or deportation decisions, 
and for the incarceration of convicted offenders. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a)–(b) (“A person 
who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of subchapter D of 
chapter 227 shall be committed to the custody of the [Federal] Bureau of Prisons . . . . The Bureau 
of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment . . . .”); id. 
§ 4001(b)(1) (vesting in the U.S. Attorney General “control and management” of federal 
correctional institutions); id. § 4001(b)(2) (“The Attorney General may establish and conduct 
industries, farms, and other activities and classify the inmates; and provide for their proper 
government, discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation.”); id. § 4013(a) 
(recognizing that the Attorney General may enter into contracts with private parties to house 
federal prisoners); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE 
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 146–55 (1988); AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra, at iii. 
 273. See, e.g., AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 272, at 13–17. It is important to distinguish 
between contracting with private parties for particular services to be provided at a federal or state 
correctional institution (e.g., food, medical care) and for confinement of inmates in a privately 
owned and operated institution (e.g., a private prison). See LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, INSIDE 
PRIVATE PRISONS 55 (2018). The former raises no eyebrows because the government is still 
responsible for all aspects of caring for the daily life of inmates. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 
U.S. 42, 54 (1988) (ruling that a physician who is under contract with the state to provide medical 
care to prisoners at a state-prison hospital acts “under color of” state law). The latter was the new 
development in the 1980s. 
 274. See, e.g., AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 272, at 15–17. 
 275. See, e.g., Douglas C. McDonald, Public Imprisonment by Private Means: The Re-
Emergence of Private Prisons and Jails in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 
34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 29, 40–42 (1994); Minow, supra note 12, at 1233 & n.19 (collecting 
studies); Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 124, at 1432–33. For an example of a summary 
rebuttal to such criticisms, see Charles H. Logan, Well Kept: Comparing Quality of Confinement 
in Private and Public Prisons, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 577, 592 (1992); David Yarden, 
Book Note, Prisons, Profits, and the Private Sector Solution, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 327–32 
(1994) (book review). 
 276. See, e.g., Harold J. Sullivan, Privatization of Corrections: A Threat to Prisoners’ 
Rights, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 139, 139–41, 152–53 (Gary Bowman et al. 
eds., 1993); RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 51–52, 110–
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federal and state governments continue to use them today, albeit on a 
relatively small scale.277  
The debate over the legitimacy and wisdom of private prisons, 
however, has recently reappeared. Even though private facilities hold a 
very small number of prisoners, they have become “ground zero for the 
anti-mass incarceration movement that sees closure of these prisons as a 
concrete step toward reducing the number of people behind bars.”278 In 
fact, during the 2020 presidential campaign several candidates promised 
to end this practice.279 Accordingly, the issue of whether prison 
privatization is an unconstitutional practice (or just an easy target for 
criticism by critics of imprisonment) is worth briefly addressing here.  
For purposes of the Private Delegation Doctrine, the question is 
whether the Due Process Clause prohibits the delegation to private parties 
of the ability to exercise one of the most powerful features of government 
authority that any polity can possess: the power to incarcerate someone, 
 
15 (1997); CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 10–12 (1990); DAVID SHICHOR, 
PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS 78–81, 166–69 (1995); MARTIN P. 
SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS 51–60 (1993); James R. Sevick, 
Introduction, in CONSTRUCTING CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 1, 3, 5, 7–8 (James R. Sevick & 
Warren I. Cikins eds., 1987); Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE 
L.J. 437, 440–44, 460–62 (2005); Martin E. Gold, The Privatization of Prisons, 28 URB. LAW. 
359, 373–79 (1996); Charles H. Logan & Sharla P. Rausch, Punish and Profit: The Emergence of 
Private Enterprise Prisons, 2 JUST. Q. 303, 316 (1985); Daniel L. Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: 
The Next Generation of Prison Management, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 
1–4, 46–47 (2003); Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. 
REV. 813, 815–16 (1987); Lawrence F. Travis III et al., Private Enterprise and Institutional 
Corrections: A Call for Caution, FED. PROB., Dec. 1985, at 11, 11–15; Ahmed A. White, Rule of 
Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 111, 112–14, 134–35 (2001); Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An 
Improper Delegation of Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 653–55, 662–74 (1987). 
There has also been considerable growth in the number not just of private correctional personnel, 
but also private security guards, who can exercise power that is either the same as or comparable 
to what state or municipal police officers possess. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the 
Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 575–78, 594–95; Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of 
Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159, 167–70 (2012). This Article does not discuss that issue. 
 277. See JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2017, 
at 16, 27 tbl.17 (2019) (noting that, as of December 31, 2017, private prison facilities, including 
non-secure community corrections centers and home confinement, held 15% of the federal prison 
population and 8% of the combined federal and state populations); EISEN, supra note 273, at 9, 
25–26, 29–32.  
 278. EISEN, supra note 273, at 10. 
 279. See, e.g., Private Prisons, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.politico.com/2020-
election/candidates-views-on-the-issues/criminal-justice-reform/private-prisons/ [https://perma. 
cc/TUY9-ZX5T] (collecting the views of the candidates then running). 
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potentially for the remainder of his natural life, or even to carry out an 
execution. This Article argues that the answer is, “It depends.”280 
Aside from the small number of cases where the death penalty is an 
available sanction for a crime, the due process safeguards born in Magna 
Carta have their most vital application when the government physically 
imprisons someone. But the decision to place someone in custody is 
perhaps subject to more constitutional restraints than any other action that 
the executive branch can take. The Fourth Amendment requires the 
government to have probable cause to arrest someone and hold him in 
custody to charge him with a crime.281 If the police arrest someone 
without first obtaining an arrest warrant or an indictment, the Fourth 
Amendment requires them to bring the suspect before a neutral and 
dispassionate magistrate within forty-eight hours so that the magistrate 
can decide whether there is probable cause to hold the suspect for trial.282 
If the federal government seeks to charge the suspect with a crime, the 
Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause requires a grand jury to charge him 
with a felony.283 In both federal and state cases, the companion Due 
Process Clause protects against a variety of practices that would corrupt 
 
 280. There are two related questions. One is whether the Constitution regulates whether and, 
if so, how a private prison may transfer an inmate from the general population to more restrictive 
conditions of confinement as a disciplinary measure. The Constitution generally allows the state 
to confine a convicted offender in any of its facilities, see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 
(1976); cf. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247 (1983) (upholding an interstate prisoner 
transfer); Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. 396, 398–99 (1876) (same), and does not further restrain 
a prison’s confinement authority unless it “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate 
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 
Temporary disciplinary segregation does not automatically meet that standard, id. at 485–87, but 
transferring a prisoner to a so-called “Supermax” facility—which generally involves solitary 
confinement for twenty-three hours per day for the duration of the inmate’s confinement (which 
is often for life)—does, Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214–15 (2005). Another question is 
whether the Constitution requires that federal or state prisoners have an available tort remedy for 
misconduct by prison guards or other personnel, such as physicians. As this Article explains 
above, the Supreme Court has declined to create a constitutional tort remedy for offenders held in 
private prisons. See supra notes 242–250. 
 281. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); see, e.g., Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 216–17 (1983); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). 
 282. See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2014); Cnty. of Riverside v. 
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112, 114 (1975). 
 283. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger . . . .”). A “felony” is punishable by imprisonment and therefore is an “infamous” crime 
for which an indictment is required. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885). 
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the trial process, such as trial before a biased judge or in a mob-dominated 
courtroom.284 The Due Process Clause also demands that the prosecution 
establish the defendant’s guilt by adequate proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.285 The Sixth Amendment grants the accused a variety of trial 
rights, such as representation by counsel and trial by jury.286 In short, the 
government cannot criminally punish someone unless and until it satisfies 
the foregoing constitutional requirements, as well as any 
subconstitutional rules that regulate the trial process, such as the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Once the government has carried its burden, 
however, it may confine the now-convicted offender for the length of his 
term of imprisonment in any of its prisons.287 At that point, the 
government has satisfied whatever “the law of the land” requires. 
Accordingly, confinement in a private prison pursuant to a court-
entered judgment of conviction satisfies the Due Process Clause.288 By 
the time a prisoner arrives at a privately run prison he has received all of 
the guarantees that the Constitution demands before the government can 
take away his liberty. The judgment of a trial court, federal or state, has 
long been the standard measure of the legality of a person’s confinement. 
That judgment was proof that the person was not languishing in jail 
simply because the Crown or sheriff took a dislike to him and decided to 
throw him into the hoosegow. It was proof that a party had received 
 
 284. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966) (holding that a defendant was 
denied a fair trial due to massive and prejudicial pre-trial publicity); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 
510, 514–15, 523 (1927) (holding unconstitutional a state law allocating a trial judge’s 
compensation based on the number of convictions in his court); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 
90–92 (1923) (ordering a hearing for a habeas corpus petitioner who had a credible allegation that 
he had been convicted at a mob-dominated trial). 
 285. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). 
 286. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence.”); see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding 
that the Sixth Amendment’s Counsel Clause guarantees an indigent defendant charged with a 
felony the right to the appointment of trial counsel at state expense). 
 287. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991) (“Every person has a 
fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the Government may not punish him unless and until 
it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial conducted in accordance with the 
relevant constitutional guarantees. But a person who has been so convicted is eligible for, and the 
court may impose, whatever punishment is authorized by statute for his offense, so long as that 
penalty is not cruel and unusual, and so long as the penalty is not based on an arbitrary distinction 
that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (citations omitted)).  
 288. To be sure, a prisoner can challenge that judgment on direct appeal or collateral attack. 
The point is that a judgment of conviction and sentence of incarceration establish the legitimacy 
of imprisonment until a federal or state court sets aside the judgment. 
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whatever process he was due before the government convicted him of a 
crime and ordered him imprisoned for committing it.289 Once an offender 
has been lawfully convicted, it should not be relevant which organization 
or person has the legal title to the facility. Only the answers to two 
questions should matter: First, is the person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a court? Second, has the government effectively removed 
the operators of the facility from compliance with all law? If the answers 
are “Yes” and “No,” respectively, there should be no reason why the 
government cannot pay a private facility to house its prisoners. The first 
question has a ready answer, but the second inquiry might not. It could 
require some examination of the legal remedies available to a prisoner to 
challenge the legality and conditions of his confinement.  
Habeas corpus is the historic remedy to obtain release from an illegal 
confinement, and both federal and state prisoners have access to the 
writ.290 Congress and the states cannot deprive a prisoner of all access to 
the writ if they confine him in a federal or state facility and therefore 
should not be able to do so simply by transferring custody to a privately 
owned and operated prison.291 In addition, Congress and the states cannot 
jail someone before trial under conditions that are tantamount to a 
criminal punishment,292 and convicted offenders cannot be forced to 
endure conditions of confinement that are “cruel and unusual.”293 For the 
reasons this Article gives above, Congress and the states cannot escape 
those limitations by placing a prisoner in a private institution. 
To be sure, a prisoner can seek injunctive relief against the federal or 
state governments, as well as damages from the responsible governmental 
official, for those violations,294 but a prisoner cannot bring a 
 
 289. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202–03 (1830). 
 290. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254–55. 
 291. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”); 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (ruling that Congress cannot deny parties 
imprisoned as enemy combatants all access to habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their 
detention). 
 292. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536–37 (1979). 
 293. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting the imposition of cruel and unusual 
punishments); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011) (concluding that overcrowding in 
California’s prisons violated the Eighth Amendment); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 
(1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–06 (1976) (interpreting the Eighth Amendment to 
prohibit “deliberate indifference” to serious medical needs of prisoners). 
 294. See, e.g., The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–80; Carlson v. Green, 
446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (implying a cause of action under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause for damages against the responsible prison officials); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681, 
685 (1978) (upholding injunctive relief and an award of attorney’s fees for state prison violations 
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause) (“Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell 
is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.”). 
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constitutional damages claim against a private party or corporation 
operating a prison under contract with the federal or a state 
government.295 Is that a flaw? Perhaps, but only in an unusual case. As 
this Article explains above, the federal or state governments may require 
a prisoner held in a private facility to seek state tort law remedies for 
unlawful conditions of confinement.296 If the available remedies are 
reasonable in their scope, even if less than perfect, requiring a prisoner to 
seek relief under state law after the fact satisfies due process 
requirements. 
The bottom line is this: Neither Congress nor the states may foreclose 
all judicial relief for such a prisoner’s claim that his confinement is 
unlawful or that its conditions damaged him. Cutting off all relief would 
allow the government to exempt itself and its delegate from the operation 
of constitutional law, which Magna Carta and the Due Process Clauses 
prevent. Otherwise, the federal and state governments have room to 
decide what relief a prisoner can pursue without violating the 
Constitution and therefore can use the services of private prisons and 
correctional officers.297 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court created the Private Delegation Doctrine more than 
a century ago, but the Court has not grounded the doctrine’s legitimacy 
in the text or history of the Constitution. Perhaps the reason for that 
omission is that the Court’s contemporary “procedure vs. substance” 
dichotomy has obscured the original meaning of the Due Process Clause: 
namely, a guarantee that the government comply with “the law of the 
land” before trespassing on someone’s life, liberty, or property. That 
guarantee, which reaches back to Chapter 39 of Magna Carta, means that 
the government cannot legislate around the Constitution. Congress 
 
 295. See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 126 (2012); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 
534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001). 
 296. Supra notes 242–250. 
 297. Two professors have argued that a private prison is an unconstitutional delegation of 
government authority to a private party. Robert Craig & andré douglas pond 
cummings, Abolishing Private Prisons: A Constitutional and Moral Imperative, 49 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 261, 282–90 (2020). Their argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. They rely on a 
fundamental rights analysis that the Supreme Court expressly rejected in Chapman v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 453, 464–65 (1991), and they fail to explain why an ex post tort remedy is not a 
satisfactory remedy for a constitutional claim, as the Supreme Court held in Minneci v. Pollard, 
565 U.S. at 129–31. They also favor consideration of an eight-part test to measure a permissible 
delegation, but say that other factors could be relevant too. Craig & cummings, supra, at 287–88. 
A non-exclusive eight-part test—particularly one without any necessary and sufficient conditions 
or an ordinal ranking of the factors’ importance—is a totality-of-the-circumstances standard 
masquerading in objective-looking clothes. It is useless as a mechanism for objective decision-
making.  
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cannot escape constitutional restraints by delegating government 
authority to private parties to accomplish indirectly what Congress cannot 
do directly. So viewed, the Private Delegation Doctrine continues to have 
vitality today. 
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